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The legal regulation of marriage and divorce, as with the
legal regulation of most other subjects, has followed a generation
behind social changes. As the role of marriage and the family
has changed, eventually the rules governing the union and its
dissolution had to catch up. In the period of rapid social change
in which we live, the traditional provisions for marriage and
divorce have long ceased to conform to the emerging social con-
ventions governing these most intimate of relationships. The
result is a period of debate and not inconsiderable confusion
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TULANE LAW REVIEW
about what role the law ought to play in a system where couples
are free to marry and divorce at will. What provisions should the
law make for winding up a couple's formerly indivisible affairs?
What interests need to be protected?
In stepping back for a moment from the modern fray, the
larger pattern which emerges is that the law of domestic rela-
tions-like the law governing many other consensual relation-
ships-has always protected the "reliance interest," that is, the
parties' change of position in reliance on the joint enterprise.1 In
traditional societies, the family served as the most important
source of wealth and status. In entering marriage, men and
women gave up their opportunity to marry others. If the mar-
riage "failed," divorced women had few opportunities for either
remarriage or other sources of livelihood, and the law accord-
ingly awarded an "innocent" wife the support she would have
received had she remained married. For men, the prospects for
remarriage were more promising. Upon divorce, an "innocent"
husband was released from his marital obligations, freeing him
to remarry and to make other use of his financial resources.
Thus, in determining the continuation or release of marital obli-
gations for husband and wife, the law compensated for the loss
of opportunity to marry others.2
In modern marriages, the foregone opportunities may be
different. In a traditional long-term marriage, the parties have
still primarily foregone other opportunities to marry. Spousal
support or freedom from marital obligations therefore remain
important remedies. But with women increasingly pursuing
their own careers and requiring their husbands to make corre-
sponding adjustments, economic losses independent of the lost
marital opportunities may exist. When a working wife leaves a
lucrative position to care for the children or her husband forgoes
a career enhancing transfer because she would be unable to relo-
cate, the economic consequences transcend the traditional
notions of support and the division of marital property. If the
marriage ends shortly after one party makes such a substantial
sacrifice in the expectation of a future return from the other,
there is no opportunity to recoup the investment.
The law governing the financial allocations made upon
1. We think it telling that the "reliance interest" concept retains its vitality more than
fifty years following publication of Fuller and Perdue's seminal article, The Reliance
Interest in Contract Damages (pts. I & 2), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 75-89.
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divorce3 has been changing in response to both the adoption of
no fault grounds for divorce and the changing nature of the reli-
ance interest in marriage. In the process, the older rules tying
spousal support to the determination of fault required for the
divorce have given way to a multiplicity of rules without any
clear explanation of the role of spousal support in a no fault era.
We believe that the time has come for a re-examination of the
entire area and that the reliance interest offers a framework for
analysis.
The first part of this article examines the changing nature of
reliance on marriage as the relationship between the spouses and
the role of the family has changed. The second section defines
the "reliance interest," as that term has been used to describe
contract damages, discusses its application to marriage, and
examines the implications for the role of "fault" in the financial
allocations to be made upon divorce. The third section describes
the varying state reactions to the adoption of no fault divorce
and assesses the ability of existing law to protect the reliance
interest in marriage. Finally, this article concludes that the
changing nature of the reliance interest-from one involving lost
opportunities to marry to one more concerned with lost career
opportunities-frames, but does not ultimately determine, the
policy choices concerning the nature of marriage and the inter-
ests to be protected upon divorce.4
3. We believe the phrase "the financial allocations to be made upon divorce" best
describes the subject of this article, and we believe that spousal support provisions should
not be made independently of property settlements. In most cases, however, the issue that
arises is whether spousal support-that is, some financial allocation above and beyond the
property distribution-is appropriate. For ease of discussion, this article has therefore
primarily focused on spousal support. We recognize, however, that similar ends could be
accomplished through an expanded definition of marital property, and we hope to compare
the two lines of analysis in a future article.
For an excellent discussion of the distinctions between the terms "alimony" and
"spousal support," see Clayton v. Clayton, 231 Md. 74, 188 A.2d 550 (1963); Holt, Support
v. Alimony in Virginia: It's Time to Use the Revised Statutes, 12 U. RICH. L. R-v. 139, 139-
40 (1977).
4. To make this discussion manageable, we are considering the relationship between
the spouses only. We believe that the issues raised by child custody and child support
involve considerations well beyond the scope of this article. In addition, while we have
tried to use gender neutral language in developing the article, we wish to note that the
major issues concerning the financial allocations to be made at the time of divorce are
shaped by the fact that women are much more likely to sacrifice their own career potential
for the benefit of the family. See infra text accompanying notes 65-67.
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I. FROM FAMILY TO INDIVIDUAL: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
In considering the role of marriage and divorce, one must
examine the fundamental changes in the nature of the institu-
tions.5 During the centuries in which land continued to be the
principal source of wealth, the family operated as the basic unit
in society.6  Marriage functioned as a highly structured, indis-
solvable, hierarchical institution,7 responsible for not only the
affairs of its members but also the management of the major
source of wealth and productivity-land.
During this period, society treated the family as an irreduci-
5. Our review does not purport to be a comprehensive history of the family. Rather
this article provides a broad brush treatment of the major developments affecting the nature
of each spouse's stake in marriage and divorce. The most original examination of the
relationship between these developments and the law has been Mary Ann Glendon's work,
particularly M. GLENDON, THE NEw FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY (1981); see also
Friedman, Rights of Passage: Divorce Law in Historical Perspective, 63 OR. L. REV. 649
(1984); Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything That Grows:" Toward a History of
Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 819; Vernier & Hurlbut, The Historical Background of
Alimony Law and its Present Statutory Structure, 6 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197 (1939);
Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption,
and the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 Nw. U.L. REv. 1038 (1979). For a critique of modern
developments, see L. WErrzMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION (1985).
Traditional historians have also rediscovered the family as a subject of study. See
generally P. ARIEs, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY LIFE
(1962); J. FLANDRIN, FAMILIES IN FORMER TIMES (1979); P. LASLETT, HOUSEHOLD AND
FAMILY IN PAST TIMES (1972); E. SHORTER, THE MAKING OF THE MODERN FAMILY
(1978); Demos, The American Family in Past Time, 43 THE AM. SCHOLAR 422 (1974);
Laslett, The Family as a Public and Private Institution. An Historical Perspective, 35 J.
MARR. & FAM. 480 (1973); Smelser & Halpern, The Historical Triangulation of Family,
Economy and Education, in TURNING POINTS: HISTORICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL ESSAYS
ON THE FAMILY 288 (J. Demos & S. Boocock eds. 1978).
Economists have recently discovered the family as a subject of study in terms of both
changes over time and its contemporary characteristics. See generally G. BECKER,
TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1981); 1. KREPS, SEX IN THE MARKETPLACE: AMERICAN
WOMEN AT WORK (1971); V. FUCHS, How WE LIVE (1983); Becker, Landes & Michael,
An Economic Analysis of Marital Instability, 85 J. POL. ECON. 1141 (1977); Ben-Porath,
The F-Connection: Families, Friends, and Firms and the Organization of Exchange, 6 Pop.
DEV. REV. 1 (1980); Gronau, The Intrafamily Allocation of Time: The Value of the
Housewives' Time, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 634 (1973); Landes, Economics ofAlimony, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 35 (1978); Pollack, A Transaction Cost Approach to Families and Households,
23 J. ECON. LiTr. 581 (1985).
6. See Krauskopf & Thomas, Partnership Marriage: The Solution to an Ineffective
and Inequitable Law of Support, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 558, 558 (1974); Demos, supra note 5, at
424.
7. J. FLANDRIN, supra note 5, at 118-30; Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study
of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1563 (1983); E. SHORTER, supra
note 5, at 72.
8. J. FLANDRIN, supra note 5, at 85-88; Smelser & Halpern, supra note 5, at 293; see
also R. KANTER, WORK AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES, A CRITICAL REVIEW AND
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ble unit, led by the husband. 9 Upon marriage, the wife lost any
independent legal existence. The family assets were held in the
husband's name; only he had the capacity to sue, be sued, own
property, and enter into contracts.10 He was responsible for the
family finances, care of dependents, and education of the chil-
dren."1 The bride, frequently a teen-age virgin marrying an
established stranger twice her age,12 promised to love, honor,
and obey.13 She was financially, psychologically, and practically
dependent on her husband. The law reinforced male authority
in the name of marital indivisibility; there would be no piercing
of the marital veil to correct abuses in the conduct of marital
responsibilities. 
1 4
For both men and women, marriage was the major determi-
nant of wealth and status. For men, marriage secured the legiti-
macy of their offspring, and with legitimacy and primogeniture,
the right of succession and authority over the family's hold-
AGENDA FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY 65 (1977); A. MACFARLANE, THE ORIGINS OF
ENGLISH INDIVIDUALISM 14-15 (1978).
9. But why is the man to be the governor? Because he is the stronger. In his
hands power sustains itself. Place the authority in the hands of the wife, every
moment will be marked by revolt on the part of the husband. This is not the only
reason: it is also probable that the husband, by the course of his life, possesses
more experience, greater aptitude for business, greater powers of application.
Johnston, Sex and Property: The Common Law Tradition, The Law School Curriculum,
and Developments Toward Equality, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1033, 1049 (1972) (citing J. Ben-
tham, Principles of the Civil Code, in 1 WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 355-56 (J. Bowring
ed. 1838)); see also Virginia Ry. & Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 120 Va. 655, 91 S.E. 632 (1917);
J.S. MILL, The Subjection of Women, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 189, 194 (1926);
J. FLANDRIN, supra note 5, at 118-29. M. GLENDON, supra note 5, at 111.
10. See E. SHORTER, supra note 5, at 72; Johnston, supra note 9, at 1045-46;
Krauskopf & Thomas, supra note 6, at 563.
11. See L. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT 2 (1981). Before this time, the
husband was responsible for rearing the children. See, e.g., 1 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 446-54 (T. Cooley ed. 1899); Comment, The
Custody of Children, 2 IND. L.J. 325 (1927); Zainaldin, supra note 5, at 1045-51; see also E.
SHORTER, supra note 5, at 67; Krauskopf & Thomas, supra note 6, at 562.
12. See Berkner, Recent Research on the History of the Family in Eastern Europe, 35
J. MARR. & FAM. 395, 398 (1973); P. LASLETr, supra note 5, at 52.
13. "[N]otwithstanding the advances made by modem women towards political and
economic independence of man, it still remains true that the normal woman married to the
normal man recognizes the obligation of obedience contained in the marriage vow, and
observes the Pauline injunction to remain subject to her husband ... ." Virginia Ry. &
Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 120 Va. 655, 661-62, 91 S.E. 632, 634 (1917); see also J. FLANDRIN,
supra note 5, at 118-23; W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at 444-45 (1803); Johnston, supra
note 9, at 1048; Demos, supra note 5, at 426-27; Perry, The Canonical Concepts of Marital
Consent: Roman Law Influences, 25 CATH. LAw. 228, 230 (1980).
14. See generally Krauskopf & Thomas, supra note 6, at 558-59; Olsen, supra note 7,
at 1521-23; see also McGuire v. McGuire, 157 Neb. 226, 59 N.W.2d 336 (1953);
Commonwealth v. George, 358 Pa. 118, 56 A.2d 228 (1948).
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ings.1 5 For women, marriage provided the only available form of
support and the only socially sanctioned role outside the con-
vent. Women had few opportunities for an independent eco-
nomic existence, and in societies that prized virginity, 16 little
opportunity for remarriage once the union was consummated.
This combination of economic and social factors produced
an enormous dependence on the stability of marriage both for
the individuals involved and for society. The law responded by
refusing to recognize "divorce" at all. The ecclesiastical courts
recognized only divorce a mensa et thoro, effectively providing
for a legal separation. 17  The marital obligations apart from
cohabitation remained unchanged."' The husband continued to
support the family and manage its affairs. He retained owner-
ship and control of the family's assets and authority over the
children.19 The wife's entitlement to support continued only
"vixerit dum sola et casta,"-that is, only so long as she
15. J. FLANDRIN, supra note 5, at 173.
16. Id. at 165. For an indication of the importance of virginity, see Atkinson,
"Precious Balsam in a Fragile Glass:" The Ideology of Virginity in the Later Middle Ages, 8
J. FAM. HIsT. 131 (1983). For a discussion on the cause of action for seduction, see infra
note 82.
Most of the available historical studies indicate a correlation between wealth and
remarriage for widows. Diefendorf, Widowhood and Remarriage in Sixteenth-Century
Paris, 7 J. FAM. HIsT. 379, 389-94 (1982); Griflith, Economy, Family and Remarriage:
Theory of Remarriage and its Application to Preindustrial England, 1 J. FAM. IssuES 479,
489 (1980); Grigg, Toward a Theory of Remarriage: A Case Study of Newburyport at the
Beginning of the Nineteenth Century, 8 J. INTERDISc. HIT. 183, 194 (1977). A study of
remarriage in colonial America indicated, however, that while wealth increased the
attractiveness of widows to available men, it also strengthened the resolve of many widows
not to remarry. Grigg, supra, at 195-96. In France, the ability of wealthier widows to
attract second husbands caused the enactment of an edict in 1560 designed to protect
children of the first marriage from being disinherited. Diefendorf, supra, at 389-90.
17. "4 mensa et thoro" translates as "from bed and board." Courson v. Courson, 213
Md. 183, 188, 129 A.2d 917, 919 (1957); see also M. RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY,
DIVORCE AND THE LAw 198 (1972); Setaro, 4 History of English Ecclesiastical Law, 18
B.U.L. REV. 102, 121-23 (1938); Younger, Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise and
Demoralization, Together with Criticism and Suggestions for Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REV.
45, 46 n.5 (1981). See generally 2 J. BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES ON MARRIAGE,
DIVORCE AND SEPARATION § 471, at 213 (1891); Vernier & Hurlbut, supra note 5, at 198
& n.10.
18. See, eg., Courson v. Courson, 213 Md. 183, 188, 129 A.2d 917, 919 (1957);
Proctor v. Proctor, 9 Hag. Con. 292, 296-97, 161 Eng. Rep. 747, 749 (1819) ("The
obligations of marriage might be suspended, but could not be extinguished, the parties
might be released in certain cases from personal cohabitation, but the relation of husband
and wife still subsisted. . . . No breach of the marriage duties affected the sacred
vinculum.").
19. Johnston, supra note 9, at 1045-46; Krauskopf & Thomas, supra note 6, at 563;
Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359, 1361 (1983);
Zainaldin, supra note 5, at 1052-74.
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remained "chast and single."' 20  However long the separation
continued, the husband and wife remained part of the same fam-
ily.2I The law protected those arrangements that depended on
the continuation of the marriage-the indivisibility of family
property, the legitimacy and inheritance rights of the children,
the authority over family holdings, and the support of
dependents.
Recognition of absolute divorce primarily affected the pos-
sibility of remarriage. Henry VIII notwithstanding, it was the
spectacle of the faithful spouse remaining bound to the marriage
while the other spouse flouted its obligations that guaranteed the
obsolescence of divorce a mensa et thoro.22 With divorce a
vinculo matrimonii, the innocent spouse who could establish that
his or her mate had engaged in adultery, cruelty, or desertion
(namely, unilateral activity incompatible with the continuation
of the marriage) was entitled to release from his or her own mar-
ital obligations.2 3 Fault was central to this determination. If
both parties were at fault, no divorce could be granted because
neither party could justify release from the marriage.2 4
20. For a discussion of the historical foundation of alimony, see Courson v. Courson,
213 Md. 183, 188-89, 129 A.2d 917, 919-20 (1957); G. v. G., 67 N.J. Eq. 30, 41, 56 A. 736,
740 (N.J. Chan. 1903). For an example of what was meant by the requirement of fidelity to
marital vows after separation, see Proctor v. Proctor, 2 Hag. Con. 291, 296-97, 161 Eng.
Rep. 747, 749 (1819); see also 2 J. BISHOP, supra note 17, at §§ 861-868, at 350-53.
21. See, eg., DiMarzio v. DiMarzio, 2 Mass. App. 174, 309 N.E.2d 520 (1974) (no
property division); Adair v. Adair, 258 Ala. 293, 62 So. 2d 437 (1952) (does not effect an
estate by the entirety nor change its essential characteristics); see also supra note 18.
Breach of the marital obligations after the award of a divorce a mensa et thoro will entitle
the nonbreaching party, even if the defendant in the original proceeding, to an absolute
divorce. See, e.g., Hermes v. Hermes, 327 So. 2d 639 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1976); Bishop
v. Bishop, 18 Ohio Misc. 177, 248 N.E.2d 641 (Ohio Com. P1. 1969); Leutoffv. Leutoff, 47
Misc. 2d 458, 262 N.Y.S.2d 736 (1965); Courson v. Courson, 213 Md. 183, 187-88, 129
A.2d 917, 920 (1957); G. v. G., 67 N.J. Eq. 30, 41, 56 A. 735, 740 (1903); Haskins v.
Haskins, 188 Va. 525, 50 S.E.2d 437 (1948); see generally Wadlington, Sexual Relations
After Separation or Divorce: The New Morality and the Old and New Divorce Laws, 63 VA.
L. REv. 249 (1977); Annotation, Divorced Woman's Subsequent Sexual Relations or
Misconduct as Warranting, Alone or with Other Circumstances, Modificaton of Alimony
Decree, 98 A.L.R. 3d 453 (1980).
22. See 2 J. BISHOP, supra note 17, § 1452.
23. Divorce a vinculo matrimonii translates as divorce from the bonds of matrimony.
See 2 J. BISHOP, supra note 17, § 469, at 213; Neuner, Modern Divorce Law-The
Compromise Solution, 28 IowA L. REV. 272, 276 (1943); Vernier & Hurlbut, supra note 5,
at 197-98 & n.5; see also M. GLENDON, supra note 5, at 53. For some of the problems
arising from desertion, see Thomas v. Contractor's Nat'l Co., 213 Miss. 672, 57 So. 2d 494
(1952); In re Moorehead's Estate, 289 Pa. 542, 137 A. 802 (1927); Stegall v. Stegall, 2
Brock 256, 22 F. Cas. 1226 (C.C. Va. 1825) (No. 13,351).
24. See, e.g., Conant v. Conant, 10 Cal. 249, 258 (1858) (Adultery "was a par
delictum, subject to the same rule of compensation which leaves the parties to find their
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The determination of fault secured the release of the inno-
cent spouse's marital obligations while legally confirming the
other's continuing obligations. Thus, if a husband succeeded in
divorcing his wife, he was released from his duty to support her
while retaining ownership of the family property and custody of
the children." Correspondingly, if a wife successfully divorced
her husband, she was released from her marital obligations of
obedience, chastity, and service to her husband. He retained
ownership of all property in his name, which ordinarily included
all jointly acquired property, subject to a duty to support her
from the proceeds.2 6 Thus, the "innocent husband" returned to
the unencumbered position he had been in before marriage, free-
ing him-both legally and financially-to marry again. The
"innocent wife" secured continuation of the support she
expected from the marriage and needed to avoid becoming a
ward of the state.27
By the end of the nineteenth century, a wholesale change
had occurred in the role of marriage and divorce.2 8 Commercial
ventures had replaced land as the primary source of wealth. 9
Men worked increasingly outside the home, with their wives
common remedy in common humiliation and mutual forgiveness."); see also Proctor v.
Proctor, 2 Hag. Con. 292, 298, 161 Eng. Rep. 747, 749 (1819).
25. Through the mid-twentieth century, a man in a common law state retained title to
all property held in his name. Since most jointly acquired property was held in the
husband's name alone, he received the lion's share of family property even after passage of
the Married Women's Property Acts. Chused, supra note 19, at 1409-10; Johnston, supra
note 9, at 1066.
26. M. GLENDON, supra note 5, at 53; Kempe v. Kempe, 1 Hag. Ecc. 532, 162 Eng.
Rptr. 668 (1828); Wallingsford v. Wallingsford, 6 H. & J. 398, 400-01, 10 Md. 485, 488
(1823) (cited in Courson v. Courson, 213 Md. 183, 186, 129 A.2d 917, 919 (1957)); Smith
v. Smith, 2 Phill. Ecc. 235, 161 Eng. Rptr. 1130 (1814); Cooke v. Cooke, 2 Phil]. Ecc. 40,
161 Eng. Rptr. 1072 (1812); see also Atkin, Spousal Maintenance: A New Philosophy?, 9
NEW ZEALAND U. L. REV. 336, 340 (1981); Chused, supra note 19, at 1405-06, n.244;
Johnston, supra note 9, at 1036; see generally Vernier & Hurlbut, supra note 5, at 198.
27. See Graves v. Graves, 108 Mass. 314, 318 (1871) (The wife should not be driven
onto the street while her husband is permitted to continue in a life of vice.). Because
support was tied to the continuation of marital obligations rather than to compensation for
the arrangements made during the marriage, there was no provision for alimony after
annulment. See 2 J. BISHOP, supra note 17, § 855, at 348; Vernier & Hurlbut, supra note 5,
at 201. For a relatively modern annulment case denying alimony on that ground, see
Denberg v. Frischman, 24 App. Div. 2d 100, 264 N.Y.S.2d 114 (1965), aff'd, 17 N.Y. 2d
778, 270 N.Y.S.2d 627, 217 N.E.2d 675, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 894 (1966).
28. One of the most important changes was the discontinuation of legislative divorce.
By the time of the civil war, the judiciary had been assigned responsibility for the
dissolution of marriages. 3 G. HOWARD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS
31-50, 96-101 (1904); see also Younger, supra note 17, at 47 & n.l1.
29. Chused, supra note 19, at 1362; Pollock, supra note 5, at 603-04.
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assuming a greater role in running the household in their
absence.3" Children, now less important as heirs to the indivisi-
ble family estate or as economic assets adding to the family
income, were raised far more by their stay-at-home mothers.3 I
Single women enjoyed increased opportunities for employment
outside the home, and married women acquired a measure of
control over their separately acquired property.32
The result of these economic changes was increasing recog-
nition of men and women's individual identity within the family
while marriage continued as a highly specialized, hierarchical (if
no longer authoritarian) and not quite so indissolvable institu-
tion. Confirming the wife's increasingly independent identity,
the Married Women's Property Acts granted married women
the capacity to own property, to sue and be sued, and to enter
into contracts.33 Upon divorce, women could recover their sepa-
rately held property and pay for separately incurred debts.34 As
the responsibility for child rearing shifted from father to mother
during the marriage, custody presumptions shifted in favor of
the mother at the time of divorce.35
At the same time, however, the law confirmed male domin-
ion over the family's commercial ventures. Upon marriage,
women were expected to give up any outside employment to
attend to family affairs.36 The husband's domicile controlled
that of his wife; she could be divorced for desertion if she did not
30. Olsen, supra note 7, at 1499; Smelser & Halpern, supra note 5, at 5307-09; see also
K. SKLAR, CATHERINE BEECHER, A STUDY IN AMERICAN DOMESTICITY (1973); Demos,
Images of the American Family, Then and Now, in CHANGING IMAGES OF THE FAMILY 43,
51 (Tufte and Myerhoff eds. 1979); Welter, The Cult of True Womanhood, 1820-1860, 18
AM. Q. 151-74 (1966).
31. See, eg., J. DEMOS, A LITTLE COMMONWEALTH: FAMILY LIFE IN PLYMOUTH
COLONY 71 (1970) (discussion of the practice of "putting out" of children); J. KETT, RITES
OF PASSAGE: YOUTH AND ADOLESCENCE IN AMERICA, 1790-PRESENT (1975); Demos,
supra note 5, at 441; see generally Stem, Smith & Doolittle, How Children Used to Work,
39 LAW & CONT. PROBS. 93 (1975).
32. See C. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 8-9, 28 (1980); J. KREPS, supra note 5, at 28-30; Younger,
supra note 17, at 68 & n.169.
33. For the history of the adoption of these laws, see 3 C. VERNIER, AMERICAN
FAMILY LAWS § 173, at 192 (1935); Johnston, supra note 9, at 1066; Younger, supra note
5, at 62-63 & nn.1 11-19; see generally Chused, supra note 19.
34. 2 J. BISHOP, supra note 17, § 1644, at 623 (1891).
35. Chused, supra note 19, at 1406; Glendon, Family Law Reform in the 1980's, 44
LA. L. REV. 1553, 1585 (1984); Zainaldin, supra note 5, at 1070-72.
36. J. KREPS, supra note 5, at 17; Demos, supra note 5, at 434; Shultz, Contractual
Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 207, 207 (1982);
see also Atkin, supra note 26, at 338.
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follow him.37 Commercial enterprises in which both spouses par-
ticipated were subject to the husband's control. 8 A wife was
entitled neither to compensation for assistance given to her hus-
band's business, nor to restitution for goods and services sup-
plied.39 Upon divorce, since the husband retained ownership of
all jointly held property,4° the wife remained entitled to and
dependent upon his support.4'
Thus, marriage remained an institution governing the rela-
tionship between two parties performing highly specialized
and-at least financially-unequal roles.42 But neither economic
productivity nor individual well-being depended to the same
degree on the indissolvability of the institution. Even a small
measure of economic independence persuaded more women to
end unhappy marriages.43 With increasing life expectancies and
declining social stigma, the prospects for remarriage increased
for both spouses.44 Rules against collusion proved ineffective in
37. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1701, 1702 (1953); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-2-
3 (1982); see also Hildebrand v. Hildebrand, 105 Ill. App. 261, 244 N.E.2d 866 (1969);
Yohey v. Yohey, 205 Pa. Super. 329, 208 A.2d 902 (1965); Graves v. Graves, 193 Va. 659,
70 S.E.2d 339 (1952).
38. See generally Johnston, supra note 9.
39. See, e.g., Leatherman v. Leatherman, 297 N.C. 618, 256 S.E.2d 793 (1979);
Matthews v. Matthews, 2 N.C. App. 143, 162 S.E.2d 697 (1968); Youngberg v. Holstrom,
252 Iowa 815, 108 N.W.2d 498 (1961); Sprinkle v. Ponder, 233 N.C. 312, 64 S.E.2d 171
(1951); Frame v. Frame, 120 Tex. 61, 36 S.W.2d 152 (1931); Miller v. Miller, 78 Iowa 177,
35 N.W. 464 (1887); Johnston, supra note 9, at 1066, 1071-73; Krauskopf & Thomas, supra
note 6, at 562; Shultz, supra note 36, at 326-27 & n.462; Note, Domestic Relations-The
Presumption of Gratuitous Services-Must a Wife Work for Free?, 16 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 235, 237 (1980). Indeed, even if the husband had promised to pay, the promise would
be unenforceable. See Porter v. Dunn, 131 N.Y. 314 (1892); Whitaker v. Whitaker, 52 N.Y.
368 (1873).
40. See, e.g., Chapman v. Mitchell, 23 N.J. Misc. 358, 359-60, 44 A.2d 392, 393 (N.J.
Super. 1945); see generally Johnston, supra note 9, at 1089; Krauskopf & Thomas, supra
note 6, at 563; Younger, supra note 17, at 48 n.15.
41. See generally Johnston, supra note 9, at 1071. Of course, for women, the
continuation of support depended on a determination that the husband's "fault" justified
termination of the marriage. See supra text accompanying note 25.
42. The roles were economically unequal in the sense that the husband's role
provided a basis for self support and probably enhanced his ability to remarry, while the
wife's role did not necessarily provide either. However, one of the major changes occuring
during the nineteenth century was a change in the view of the women's role from an
inherently inferior one to a separate but potentially equal one. See C. DEGLER, supra note
32, at 8-9; Chused, supra note 19, at 1420; Demos, supra note 5, at 422-35; Smelser &
Halpern, supra note 5, at 289; see also Olsen, supra note 7, at 1499.
43. See generally Friedman, supra note 5, at 651-54. Divorce rates rose further
following World War I, reaching a high of 610,000, or 4.3 per 100 population, in 1946. The
postwar years brought a brief respite in the trend. Davis, Statistical Perspective on
Marriage and Divorce, 272 ANNULS 9, 18 (1950).
44. Indeed, Glendon suggests that high mortality rates in earlier societies meant that
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divorce suits. With less draconian consequences, the parties
became more willing to collaborate in establishing fault, and the
courts more willing to grant divorces.45 Nonetheless, the alloca-
tions made upon divorce were still tied to findings of fault and
still designed to protect the major interests at stake: the indivisi-
bility of commercial ventures, support for the dependent spouse,
and custody for the wife as the parent most directly involved in
the children's upbringing.
If the nineteenth century produced major changes in mar-
riage and divorce, the twentieth century witnessed a wholesale
revolution. By the last part of the twentieth century, the major
source of wealth had long since ceased to be land or family held
ventures. Large organizations, whether public or private, deter-
mined productivity.46 Entitlements to jobs, earning power, pen-
sions, and government benefits have become the major sources of
income.47 Families no longer govern the major sources of wealth
most marriages were of short duration even without divorce. M. GLENDON, supra note 5,
at 30.
With respect to social attitudes toward divorce, see Kelso, The Changing Social Setting
of Alimony Law, 6 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 186 (1939):
It would seem, further, to be a reasonable consequence of the changed social
position of woman that attitudes toward divorce would show decreasing
disapproval. People generally realize the economic strain that now attends family
life. They see the wife forced to carry on a tour of labor or of professional work
outside the home. They find the husband harassed by the struggle for means of
support of himself and his family. Hence they look with some leniency upon the
parties when quarreling and discontent arise in the home. They are less prone to
condemn the wife for seeking divorce or the husband for failing to provide
adequate support. Divorce is no longer followed by social ostracism. That which
formerly was looked upon as fault and sin, tends nowadays to be viewed as
misfortune calling for sympathy.
Id. at 193.
Lenore Weitzman reported in 1981 that remarriage by women was largely a function
of the women's age at the time of divorce. Women under 30 had a 75% chance of remarry-
ing, while women over 40 had only a 28% chance of remarring. Weitzman, The Economics
of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support
Awards, 28 UCLA L. REv. 1181, 1228-29 (1981) (citing Nat'l Center for Health Statistics,
U.S. Department of Health, Monthly Vital Statistics Report (Supp. Sept. 12, 1980)). At
ages of 25-44, remarriage rates are almost twice as high for men as for women. V. FUCHS,
supra note 5, at 152. But cf Survey of Economic Opportunity, Series P-20, no. 223, U.S.
Bureau of the Census, cited in Becker, Landes & Michael, supra note 5, at 1172-77. This
data, which is taken from records from the 1960s, shows somewhat higher rates of remar-
riage generally though it, too, shows greater remarriage by men than women, and a
stronger (negative) correlation between age and remarriage for women than for men.
45. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 138 Colo. 74, 329 P.2d 633 (1958). See generally M.
RHEINSTEIN, supra note 17, at 247-60; Note, A Survey of Mental Cruelty as a Ground for
Divorce, 15 DE PAUL L. REV. 159, 163 (1965).
46. See M. GLENDON, supra note 5, at 91-96.
47. Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of Marriage, 62 VA. L.
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nor necessarily determine their members' lifelong financial
prospects.
As dependence on the family generally has decreased, the
division of labor within the family has become less specialized.48
Employment outside the home has become increasingly common
for women of all ages and marital status.49 During the same
period, life expectancy has increased, the number of children per
family has fallen, nuclear families have become more common,
and labor saving devices have made household chores less oner-
ous. 50  Childrearing, housekeeping, and care of older or infirm
relatives no longer take up the overwhelming part of an adult
woman's lifespan. Women are accordingly freer to pursue other
activities and, with their own income, are less dependent on the
support of their husbands.
With the family no longer the exclusive determinant of sta-
tus and wealth, the justification for marriage has changed from
social obligation to mutual affection. 1 Societal norms no longer
REV. 663, 710 (1976); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1963); see also
Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing Spouse's Education: Legal Protection for the Marital
Investor in Human Capital, 28 KAN. L. REV. 379, 411 (1980); Weitzman, Legal Regulation
of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 1169, 1185 n.82 (1974).
48. See Becker, Landes & Michael, supra note 5, at 1146 & n.5 (1977); L.
WEITZMAN, supra note 11, at 168-69; Garrison, Book Review, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 1039,
1043 (1983). The economics of the family literature, particularly that by Becker, Landes &
Michael, supra note 5, adopts the theory of comparative advantage to argue that men and
women should perform specialized roles and that women, for biological reasons, should
assume the greater responsibility for childcare and housekeeping. Specialization within the
family, however, is only part of the story. Most studies show that, in spite of greater labor
force participation by women, the assignment of responsibilities within the family remains
highly specialized, with women continuing to assume the primary responsibility for
children and the home. See infra note 66. The major changes stem not from less
specilization within the family but from greater specialization among women. While men
share child care and homemaking responsibilities only to a small degree more than they did
before, women are now increasingly hiring other women to help provide domestic services.
Thus, much of the economics of the family literature advocating specialized roles and
especially that by Becker, supra note 5, at 14-37; Landes, supra note 5, at 40-44; Becker,
Landes & Michael, supra note 5, at 1152-53, is simply beside the point. Indeed, their use of
the theory of comparative advantage would support more, not less, labor force
participation by women, since increased specialization among women would presumably
result in many of the same benefits as specialization between men and women.
49. See generally C. BIRD, THE TWO-PAYCHECK MARRIAGE (1979).
50. See id. at 13; J. FLANDRIN, supra note 5, at 153; V. FucHs, supra note 5, at 133;
J. KREPS, supra note 5, at 78; E. SHORTER, supra note 5, at 17, 24, 26, 31, 33; Johnston,
supra note 9, at 1066.
51. E. SHORTER, supra note 5, at 5. See also Demos, supra note 5, at 425-26;
Grossberg, Guarding the Altar, Physiological Restrictions and the Rise of State Intervention
in Matrimony, 26 AM. J. LEGAL HisT. 197, 208 (1982); Model & Furstenberg, The Timing
of Marriage in the Transition to Adulthood: Continuity and Change, 1860-1975, in
RELIANCE INTEREST
regard it as a sufficient reason to marry that the spouse has
parental approval, that he or she come from a "good family,"
that he be able to support her "in the style to which she has been
accustomed," or that she be able to promote his well-being
through her ability as a homemaker or entertainer." The basis
of modem marriage is love. And when love disappears, when
there is no longer mutual affection, society dictates no reason to
stay married.
5 3
In modem society, divorce plays an altogether different
role. Divorce is a matter of individual choice, following not
from the abdication or breach of marital duties, but from the end
of mutual affection. Where each spouse has the right to leave,
the identification of "fault" is meaningless.5 4 Divorce is no
longer the unilateral release of a spouse from his or her marital
obligations justified by the breach of the other spouse. It is a
determination-precipitated perhaps by the actions of one
spouse, but nonetheless applicable to both-that marital differ-
ences have become irreconcilable. Modem divorce law eventu-
ally followed this social transformation, with all states now
recognizing "no fault" divorce.5 5 Even where fault grounds are
still available, most couples agree to the dissolution of their
union without a pro forma assignment of blame.
5 6
With these changes in the nature of marriage and divorce,
the allocations made at the time of the divorce serve different
purposes. Without a societally imposed duty to continue the
marriage, modem divorce courts emphasize the severance of
TURNING POINTS 133 (J. Demos & S. Boocock eds. 1978); Smelser & Halpern, supra note
5, at 307.
52. E. SHORTER, supra note 5, at 6; Skolnick, The Social Contexts of Cohabitation, 29
AM. J. OF COMP. L. 339, 348 (1981).
53. The one remaining reason is children, and there is no longer a clear societal
consensus that an unhappy couple should stay together solely for the sake of the children.
See generally K. KENNISTON, ALL OUR CHILDREN: THE AMERICAN FAMILY UNDER
PRESSURE 21 (1977).
54. That is, fault is meaningless as a prerequisite for divorce. It may still be relevant
for the financial awards made at the time of divorce. See infra text accompanying notes 85-
89.
55. South Dakota became the last to adopt no fault grounds on March 14, 1985, with
the signing of H.B. 1169, which added irreconcilable differences to S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§§ 25-42, 25-4-17.1 (Michie Co. 1985); see generally L. WEITZMAN, supra note 5, at 15-51;
Friedman, supra note 5, at 664-69.
56. Indeed, the "trivialization" of the fault requirement may have provided a major
impetus for no fault divorce. See, e.g., Madox, Who Pays for No-Fault Divorce?, 283 THE
ECONOMIST 75 (1982); Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 951 n.3 (1979).
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marital bonds rather than the identification of which obligations
are to continue.57 With less specialization in marital roles, the
husband is no longer given ownership of the property while the
"innocent" wife receives alimony. Most states allow each spouse
to reclaim the property he or she brought into the marriage, and
to retain gifts or bequests, while providing approximately equal
division of property acquired during the marriage.58 With both
spouses presumed independent upon divorce,59 and with no
determination of culpability for the marital breakup, 60 the courts
intervene primarily to resolve the division of jointly held prop-
erty.61 They are reluctant to impose any continuing relationship
on the couple once the divorce has become final. Formerly indi-
visible family ventures are not included in the property settle-
57. See, e.g., Pratt v. Pratt, 23 Pa. D. & C. 673 (1982); O'Kelly, Entitlements to
Spousal Support After Divorce, 61 N.D.L. REV. 225 (1985).
58. See generally ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-318 (1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-12-
315 (1987); CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800 (West 1986); IDAHO CODE § 32-712 (1980); ILL. REV.
STAT. cl. 40, para. 503(a)(1) (1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2801 (West 1982); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 125.150 (1985); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A: 34-23 (1983); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 236B (1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-7 (1973); PA. CONS. STAT. § 23:401 (1980);
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.080 (1973); WiS. STAT. § 766.31 (1985); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
107.3 (1986); L. WEITZMAN, supra note 5, at 70-73; see also Kay, Equality and Differences:
A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and its Aftermath, 56 U. CINN. L. REV. 1, 49-51 (1987).
59. This presumption emphasizes short term support orders tied to a demonstration
of "need." See L. WEITZMAN, supra note 11, at 41-46; Atkin, supra note 26, at 342;
Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change, 1983 Wis. L.
REV. 789, 829, 835; McGraw, Sterin & Davis, A Case Study in Divorce Law Reform and its
Aftermath, 20 J. FAM. L. 443, 462-73 (1981-82); Weitzman & Dixon, The Alimony Law
Myth: Does No-Fault Divorce Make A Difference?, 14 FAM. L.Q. 141, 148-49 (1980); see
also UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 308, 9A U.L.A. 347 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as UMDA]; see also infra text accompanying notes 105, 133 & 150; see generally Temple,
Freedom of Contract and Intimate Relationships, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 121 (1985).
60. That is, divorce no longer requires a determination of fault as a prerequisite for
dissolution of the union. Many states still permit consideration of marital misconduct in
the award of spousal support. See infra notes 111, 125 & 129 and accompanying text.
61. "With the bitterness that frequently follows a dissolution, the ideal situation
would be to put the parties' economic differences to rest with the property division. Where
possible, each party should be given his or her own separate assets." Sackett & Munyon,
Alimony: A Retreat From Traditional -Concepts Of Spousal Support, 35 DRAKE L. REV.
297, 302 (1985-86). See In re Marriage of Mentel, 359 N.W.2d 505, 506 (Iowa App. 1984).
So long as husbands tended to hold jointly acquired property solely in their own name, and
to retain that property after divorce, alimony served to redress-at least to some degree-
the unequal property division. See Atkin, supra note 26, at 340; M. GLENDON, supra note
5, at 53; Neuner, supra note 23, at 282 & n.29. With relatively more equal property
divisions, modern spousal support is no longer necessary to balance generous property
awards to the other spouse. This is consistent with the modern emphasis on termination
rather than reaffirmation of marital responsibilities. See UMDA, § 102, 9A U.L.A. 158
(1973); McArdle v. McArdle, 55 Il1. App. 3d 829, 370 N.E.2d 1309 (1977); In re Rislove,
31 Or. App. 305, 570 P.2d 403 (1977).
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ment while the most important sources of modem wealth-
entitlements to future income--remain the province of
individuals.62
The result is an uneasy coexistence of two systems that
together, describe only a minority of modem marriages. In
traditional marriages where the wife continues to depend upon
her husband's income, modem divorce law keeps open the possi-
bility of permanent alimony justified by dependence.63 When
both spouses are capable of self-support, the law provides for an
approximately equal property division.64 But in an increasing
majority of marriages, wives are neither dependent nor equal.
Whether because of sex discrimination, the division of mari-
tal responsibilities, or individual differences in ability, ambition,
education, training, or social encouragement, husbands are
likely to earn more than their working wives.65 For their part,
women continue to assume a large share of the family's domestic
responsibilities, a share compounded with the arrival of chil-
dren.66 The longer the marriage, the more likely even working
women are to be dependent on their husband's income to main-
tain their standard of living, the more likely they are to have
sacrificed to some degree their own financial future to further the
marriage, and the less likely their prospects for remarriage
become .67 In addition, men are, perhaps for the first time, mak-
ing similar sacrifices to support their wives' careers or to partici-
pate in raising the children. The existing system of marriage and
divorce provides no scale for balancing these sacrifices, and
62. See M. GLENDON, supra note 5, at 60; Sackett & Munyon, supra note 61, at 302-
03. See generally Reich, supra note 47.
63. See generally Fineman, supra note 59, at 801-10; O'Kelly, supra note 57, at 227;
Comment, For Richer or Poorer-Equities in the Career Threshhold, No Asset Divorce, 58
TUL. L. REV. 791, 796 (1984); infra note 132.
64. See supra note 58.
65. M. GLENDON, supra note 5, at 130; J. KREPS, supra note 5, at 2; Blumrosen,
Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation and Women Workers, 6 WOMENS RTs. L. REP. 19,
24 (1980); Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor Market Hostility to Working
Mothers, 59 B.U.L. REV. 55, 57 (1979); Weitzman, supra note 44, at 1238.
66. C. BIRD, supra note 49, at 95, 97; G. GAIN, MARRIED WOMEN IN THE LABOR
FORCE 7 (1966); J. KREPS, supra note 5, at 43; A. SKOLNICK, THE INTIMATE
ENVIRONMENT 245 (1978); Fineman, supra note 59, at 858 & n.194; Frug, supra note 65, at
102.
67. Frug, supra note 65, at 100; Maddox, supra note 56, at 84; Weitzman, supra note
44, at 1228-29. After a relatively short marriage, especially if there are no children, a wife's
opportunities to remarry, and to take advantage of available career prospects, should be
relatively unaffected. See generally Rubin, Are Working Wives Hazardous to Their
Husband's Mental Health?, 17 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 70, 72 (1983).
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while modem commentators have decried the resulting inequi-
ties,68 there has been no comprehensive analysis of the interests
at stake.
II. AN EXAMINATION OF THE RELIANCE INTEREST IN
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
In examining the historical developments underlying mar-
riage and divorce, a consistent theme emerges: the protection of
the reliance interest in marriage. In traditional societies where
women had few prospects for support, remarriage, or an
independent existence apart from the family, the law did not rec-
ognize divorce at all. As the consequences of marital dissolution
became less catastrophic, the emphasis on fault still made
divorce difficult and provided often generous support for a
dependent spouse subject to desertion, cruelty, or adultery.
Throughout its evolution, the law has protected male investment
in the sources of family income, freeing "innocent" men from
the financial burdens that might otherwise have restricted their
prospects for remarriage, while requiring culpable men to sup-
port their former wives from their uninterrupted income. In the
modem realm, where divorce is more frequent and both spouses
are increasingly independent, the nature of the reliance interest
itself needs to be reexamined.
When used to describe damages in contract, the "reliance
interest" is the position the parties would have been in had the
contract never been created.69 In its broadest sense, this position
68. Weitzman has been the leading critic, insisting that divorce leaves most men
financially better off and most women worse off than they were when married. Weitzman
arrives at this conclusion by assuming that during marriage, each spouse has access to half
the family income, and after divorce, each spouse has access only to his or her own income
and spousal support if provided. Since men generally earn more than their former wives,
and since support awards do not come close to making up the difference, men are by
definition "better off." This somewhat overstates the case, however, since both parties'
expenses after divorce are likely to be higher than they were during the marriage, and since
Weitzman does not take into account the loss of non-income producing contributions to the
marriage, such as housework. Nonetheless, there is relatively little dispute that women are
often in financially worse shape after a divorce than they were in the marriage and that
divorced women are relatively worse off than divorced men. See Weitzman, supra note 44;
see also Fineman, supra note 59, at 826-30; Krauskopf, supra note 47, at 392; O'Kelly,
supra note 57, at 246; Sharp, The Partnership Ideak The Development of Equitable
Distribution in North Carolina, 65 N.C.L. REv. 195, 197-201 & n.3 (1987); Wishik,
Economics of Divorce: An Exploratory Study, 20 FAM. L.Q. 79, 99 (1986). For an excellent
review of Weitzman's work and subsequent developments, see Kay, supra note 58, at 59-77.
69. In defining the "reliance interest," we are using the term in the sense developed
originally by Fuller and Perdue, supra note 1. That definition has now been incorporated in
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includes opportunities foreclosed by the contract, activities
which would not have been undertaken but for the contract, and
performance required by the contract. The reliance interest has
been defined in contrast to the "expectation interest," which is
the position the parties would have been in had the contract
been performed, and the "restitution interest," which requires
disgorgement of any benefit conferred in partial performance of
the contract. 70 Fuller and Perdue saw, however, that in a com-
petitive market, expectation and reliance tended to converge.71
In a market with many buyers and sellers exchanging similar
products, the opportunity chosen (namely, the return expected
from the contract) ought to be all but identical to the next best
alternative, assuming a substantial array of choices.72 Fuller and
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (1981). See Hudec, Restating the
Reliance Interest, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 704 (1982). The "reliance interest" should not be
confused with "detrimental reliance" or "promissory estoppel" as a separate theory of
liability. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). Fuller and Perdue
developed the principle of reliance, in its broadest sense, to explain the entire range of
contract damages, not just those associated with the type of nonbargain promises at issue in
§ 90.
70. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (1981); Fuller & Perdue,
supra note 1, at 53-54. Thus, in a construction contract which Owner A breaches after
Builder B completes the basement and orders, but does not install, custom designed
windows, protection of the expectation interest would give Builder B the benefit of the
bargain. In order to put Builder B in the position he would have been in had the contract
been performed, he would receive compensation for any work performed before the breach,
money lost purchasing the windows, and any lost profits on the contract. A restitution
award would require Owner A to pay only for any benefit he had received, that is,
compensation for construction of the basement. Protection of the reliance interest would
require compensation for any expenses incurred before the breach, including payment both
for the basement and the custom made windows, if the builder were unable to resell them.
71. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 55-56, 60-63. The idea that the expectation
measure and the reliance measure ought to be almost identical for most contracts is the
major contribution of the piece and the one most often overlooked. Fuller and Perdue's
article led to greater recognition of reliance in those areas where expectation and reliance
diverged. "Reliance" is still used in many contexts to refer only to expenses incurred, not
opportunities foregone. See generally Hudec, supra note 69.
72. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 60. Using the example in note 70 supra, if
Builder B had not entered into the contract with Owner A, he not only would have been
spared the expenses on the basement and the windows, but he also would have entered into
another contract. His profit from the other contract would presumably have been no
greater, since if the other job paid more, he would have chosen it over the contract with
Owner A. Fuller and Perdue also note, however, that the profit would presumably be no
less. They reasoned that if Owner A were paying above market rates, other contractors
would bid down the price. If Owner A could have hired a different contractor at a lower
price both he and the other owner would presumably have done so. So long as the services
offered by Builder B are approximately the same as those offered by other builders, and
there are many competing builders and owners, one would expect both the contract with
Owner A and any alternative contracts to reflect the market price. Accordingly, any effort
to put Builder B in the position he would have been in had he never entered into the
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Perdue accordingly concluded that the major justification for
award of an expectation measure of contract damages was in fact
to protect reliance. They reasoned that, given the difficulty of
proving foregone opportunities with any certainty, the benefits
expected from the contract provided the most workable estima-
tion of the full reliance loss; furthermore, only protection of the
expectation interest would encourage reliance on contract.73
Where expectation and reliance diverged, however, contract law
tended to protect only the reliance interest.74
We believe that many of the changes in marriage stem from
changes in the nature of the reliance interest and its relationship
to the expectation interest in marriage. In traditional societies,
the reliance interest and the expectation interest in marriage
tended to converge. For women, marriage provided the most
certain (and for some the only) source of income and status.
Virtually all women married, and those marriages were fre-
quently within their own social class and to the man who offered
the greatest material advantages. v6 If they did not marry,
women were primarily dependent on the lesser support likely to
be received from their families and the little money earned on
their own. 7
contract with Owner A should include the profit lost from alternative contracts. Proving
the amount of that profit is inherently problematic, but economists would expect the lost
profit to approximate that profit expected from the contract with Owner A. The
expectation interest (including the profit on contract with Owner A) would thus equal the
full reliance interest.
73. Fuller and Perdue reasoned that in order to protect reliance, it was necessary to
"dispense with its proof":
[T]he rule measuring damages by the expectancy may also be regarded as a
prophylaxis against the losses resulting from detrimental reliance. Whatever
tends to discourage breach of contract tends to prevent the losses occasioned
through reliance. Since the expectation interest furnishes a more easily
administered measure of recovery than the reliance interest, it will in practice
offer a more effective sanction against contract breach.
Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 61.
74. Id. at 79.
75. See M. GLENDON, supra note 5, at 31-32. For a discussion of changing attitudes
on this score during the nineteenth century, see E. CRAIK, MARRIAGE AND PROPERTY
166-67 (E. Craik ed. 1984).
76. See generally E. CRAIK, supra note 75; L. TERMAN, GENETIC STUDIES OF
GENIUS (1925); see also Becker, Landes & Michael, supra note 5, at 1151, on the tendency
to marry within one's own social class.
77. The ability of women to hold property varied with time. During the period
dominated by primogeniture, it was rare for women to inherit at all. See, e.g., Kettle, My
Wife Shall Have It: Marriage and Property in the Wills and Testaments of Later Medieval
England, in E. CRAIK, supra note 75, at 89-103. Women who did acquire property of their
own ceded control to their husbands during marriage. See, e.g., J. BISHOP, MARRIAGE,
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In entering marriage, then, a traditional woman's most
important loss was the opportunity to have married another.
While the value of these other possible mates is impossible to
measure, it is reasonable to assume that, so long as she married
within her own social class, another man would have offered
advantages similar to those provided by the groom she chose.78
With the failure of a first marriage, however, women have rarely
had the opportunity for as advantageous a second marriage.79
Accordingly, for traditional women, the expectation interest
(defined in terms of the level of support provided by the mar-
riage) 80 tended to be the best measure of the reliance loss
DIVORCE AND SEPARATION § 1144 (1891); 3 W. HOLDsWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 526-27 (6th ed. 1903); 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
404-05 (2d ed. 1894).
Until a woman married, her father was responsible for her support. See, e.g., Suire v.
Miller, 363 So. 2d 945 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1978) (discussion of the concept of
emancipation and its limitation).
78. See supra note 76.
79. P. ENGLAND & G. FARKAS, HOUSEHOLDS, EMPLOYMENT AND GENDER 54-59
(1986). Even before the twentieth century, the ability of women to remarry has varied
greatly over time and in different societies, and comprehensive data is unavailable. The
popular literature and modem marital data suggests a strong negative correlation for
women between age and marital opportunities, so that simply the passage of time during
the course of the marriage is likely to have had a negative effect. See Becker, Landes &
Michael, supra note 5, at 1151-77; Cohen, Marriage, Divorce and Quasi Rents; or, "I Gave
Him The Best Years of My Life," 16 J. LEG. STUDIES 267, 268 (1987); Weitzman, supra
note 44, at 1229. Of course, so long as divorce was difficult or carried a strong stigma, it
would be impossible to determine to what degree the marriage itself, as opposed to the
manner of its termination, foreclosed other opportunities. See supra note 44; see also Book
Review, Wallis and Edward, Letters 1931-1937, The Intimate Correspondence of the Duke
and Duchess of Windsor, THE WASHINGTON POST BOOK WORLD 5 (1986) ("In the court
of Queen Victoria, for most of her reign, divorced women, even when innocent parties,
could not be received.").
80. Defining this expectation interest in terms of the level of support at the time of
divorce is at best an imperfect compromise. To the extent the expectation interest and the
reliance interest coincide, it is the expectation interest at the time of the marriage which one
would expect to mirror the opportunities foreclosed by the marriage. But that measure-
the expected value of the failed marriage at the time of its inception-is almost as difficult
to determine as the reliance interest itself. The level of support enjoyed at the time of the
divorce is easier to ascertain.
The expectation interest at the time of divorce, however, should normally be defined to
include not only the support received during the marriage but also any changes expected
thereafter or, in more technical terms, the present value of the projected earnings stream.
This measure, while still somewhat speculative, could be estimated at the time of divorce
or, where permanent alimony is awarded, it could be adjusted as circumstances change.
This, however, is rarely done.
One suspects that the courts, eager to terminate the union between the parties, are
more serious about reliance than expectation. However egregious the husband's "fault,"
there seems to be little enthusiasm for requiring him to share the good fortune he enjoys
after the marriage ends. See, e.g., Cole v. Cole, 44 Md. App. 435, 409 A.2d 734 (1979). At
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(defined in terms of the lost opportunity to be married to
another).81 This type of reliance could be tremendously impor-
tant in societies that provide limited opportunities for remar-
riage or self-support, and it could be protected effectively only
through recognition of the expectation interest in marriage.
Although for different reasons and with different conse-
quences, the traditional man's major form of reliance on mar-
riage was also the foregone opportunity to have married another.
After entering marriage, men, like women, necessarily gave up
their opportunity to have married someone else. But since soci-
ety has never valued male youth or virginity as much as male
status and income,8 2 their prospects for as favorable a second
the same time, however, there is recognition that the wife's position has changed not only
because of the opportunities she forewent as a teenage bride but because of the changes in
lifestyle she experienced during the years of affluence. The hardship Joe Theisman's wife
suffered upon divorce would not be any less if, at the time of their marriage, she had not
anticipated his success as an NFL quarterback. Nor would it be any less if she could not
have expected to marry another man earning as much as Joe Theisman did at the time of
their divorce. So even if the courts are more interested in protecting foregone opportunities
than in enforcing promises, they are still responsive to changes in lifestyle over the course
of the marriage.
81. For these purposes, it is not important that the level of support during the
marriage and the level of support possible from foregone marital prospects be identical.
Even if they are not, Fuller and Perdue argue that (1) "the impossibility of subjecting this
type of reliance [the foregoing of other opportunities] to any kind of measurement may
justify a categorical rule granting the value of the expectancy as the most effective way of
compensating for such losses," and (2) that the "difficulties in proving reliance and
subjecting it to pecuniary measurement are such that... [t]o encourage reliance, we must
therefore dispense with its proof." Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 60, 62. In marriage,
even more than in other contracts, imperfect information, transaction costs, and the
absence of a perfectly competitive market may prevent any certain equation between the
opportunities chosen and those foregone. For our purposes, the important thing is that the
level of support provided during the marriage affords the only available measure of the
interests at stake, and it is therefore enough that there is some reason to believe that the
level of support approximates the financial value of the foregone opportunities.
The greater the disparity in income, ability and/or social standing between the two
spouses, however, the more unlikely it becomes that the poorer spouse, in fact, enjoyed
other opportunities to marry as well. Here, the expectation interest exceeds the reliance
interest and modem courts, at least, appear reluctant to order a level of support truly equal
to the relatively lavish standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. See, e.g., In re
Marriage of Carney, 122 Ill. App. 3d 705, 462 N.E.2d 596 (1984); Bahr v. Bahr, 107 Wis.
2d 72, 318 N.W.2d 391 (1982); In re Marriage of Johnson, 106 Ill. App. 3d 502, 436
N.E.2d 228 (1982). In cases where the wife's income exceeds that of the husband's, it is
also less likely that he forewent other opportunities to marry as well and that may justify
lower awards for men than for women in the same circumstances. See, e.g., Pfohl v. Pfohl,
345 So. 2d 371, 376-77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
82. For an indication of the importance of virginity for women, see discussion of the
common law action for seduction in Davidson v. Abbott, 52 Vt. 570 (1880); Blagge v.
Ilsley, 127 Mass. 191 (1879); Dain v. Wycoff, 18 N.Y. 45 (1858); Kendrick v. McCrary, 11
Ga. 603 (1852). The cause of action was abolished in most states beginning in the 1950s.
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marriage depended primarily on their ability to retain control of
whatever wealth they possessed.83 Unencumbered by the stigma
of fault or financial burdens from a failed first marriage, men
primarily surrendered their ability to secure an alternative line
of succession.84
Society could protect both men and women's interests in
marriage only by discouraging divorce. Traditional societies did
this initially by refusing to recognize divorce85 and later by using
the concept of fault to make divorce difficult and expensive for
the wrongdoer.86 But once divorce occurred, the law had to
choose between men's and women's competing claims. To
award women the support they had enjoyed during the marriage
undermined the ability of divorced men to mitigate their losses
by remarrying well. Fault provided a basis for that choice. Since
fault justified only the release of the innocent party's marital
obligations, a guilty husband remained obligated to support his
wife in the style to which she had become accustomed during the
marriage, while an innocent husband regained control of the
wealth he needed to mitigate his losses.8 7 In either case, the law
protected the legitimacy of the children and the right of succes-
sion. 8' Thus, protection of the expectation interest in marriage
See generally Note, Breach of Promise of Marriage: California Civil Code Section 43.5, 4
UCLA L. REV. 114 (1956).
On the relatively greater handicap age poses for women than for men, see supra note
79 and infra note 83.
83. See Berkner, supra note 12, at 398; see also V. FUCHS, supra note 5, at 152;
Becker, Landes & Michael, supra note 5, at 1173, contending that even in modem times a
man's ability to remarry is directly proportional to his wealth upon divorce. See generally
NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND
WELFARE, 100 YEARS OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE STATISTICS UNITED STATES, 1867-
1967 (Vital and Health Statistics Series 21 No. 24 1973).
84. M. GLENDON, supra note 5, at 31-32.
85. In most staes the judiciary did not acquire authority to enter final divorce decrees
until at least the nineteenth century. See, e.g., Act of 1785, [1785] Mass. Acts ch. 69, § 5;
Act of March 15, 1815, 2 Smith's Laws (Pa.) 343; Act of March 18, 1848, [1847-48] Va.
Acts ch. 122, § 4; see also Friedman, supra note 5, at 651-54.
86. Indeed, as Fuller and Perdue's general analysis of contract damages suggests, the
major purpose of much of divorce law may have been to protect reliance on marriage by
discouraging divorce. See supra note 72. The emphasis on fault and the fear of a
substantial financial burden should have acted as a deterrent to those considering
termination of their marriages. For the continuing social stigma associated with divorce,
see supra notes 44 & 79.
87. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
88. In fact, even if the marriage was annulled as void, the children were legitimated.
See, e.g., Kasey v. Richardson, 331 F. Supp. 580 (W.D. Va. 1971), aff'd, 462 F.2d 757 (4th
Cir. 1972); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-31.1 (1978); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(9)(1)-4(9)(2), 9B
U.L.A. 298-99 (1987).
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and reliance in the form of lost opportunities to marry another
depended on fault. 89
In modem society, the reliance interest in marriage is more
varied, with different implications for the type of protection the
law should afford. In entering today's marriages, men and
women continue to forego the opportunity to marry others.
These foregone opportunities remain more important for women
than for men because women are more likely to marry mates
earning more than the women could earn on their own, and the
prospects for remarriage remain better for men than for
women.90  Nonetheless, due to the expansion of employment
opportunities for women, wives are less likely to be completely
dependent on their husbands' income for support upon
divorce.91 With women contributing to the family income, the
husband's ability to remarry no longer depends to the same
degree upon his financial resources. Moreover, for both men and
89. It should be emphasized that fault is important to protect this interest because of
the choice required between men and women's competing reliance interests, and not
because of the form of the divorce proceeding. The choice required remains the same
whether the remedy is characterized as specific performance of the marital duty of support,
damages for breach of marital vows, or compensation for detrimental reliance on the other
spouse to provide support.
We emphasize this because some courts have advanced a theory of detrimental
reliance upon lifelong support as though it were independent of the reasons for the
termination of the marriage. Professor Krauskopf, for example, has recently cited a
Missouri case employing the language of detrimental reliance. In Jamison v. Churchill
Truck Lines, 632 S.W.2d 34, 35-36 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982), the court wrote:
Marriages involve long term commitments. Spouses often detrimentally rely on
these commitments ....
Maintenance is awarded when one spouse has detrimentally relied on the
other spouse to provide the monetary support during the marriage. If the relying
spouse's withdrawal from the marketplace so injures his marketable skills that he
is unable to provide for his reasonable needs maintenance may be awarded.
Maintenance provides a remedy for a spouse's reliance.
See also Krauskopf, Maintenance: A Decade of Development, 50 Mo. L. REv. 259, 293
(1985). We agree that maintenance can provide a remedy for a party's reliance on the
spouse's lifelong promise of support, but only if the spouse has breached that promise by
wrongfully causing the end of the marriage. Detrimental reliance requires breach of the
promise as an element of the cause of action. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 90 (1981). Otherwise, as we have observed above, the paying spouse's reliance on
the marriage must also be protected.
90. V. FUCHS, supra note 5, at 135-36; Weitzman, supra note 44, at 1229; see also
notes 79 & 83. For these reasons as well, men married to women earning more than they
could have earned on their own are less likely than similarly situated women to have
foregone other opportunities to have married similarly wealthy spouses. See supra note 78.
91. WOMEN'S BUREAU, OFFICE OF SECRETARY, U.S. DEPr. OF LABOR, LEAFLET
VOL. 20, FACTS ON WOMEN WORKERS (1982); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF
COMMERCE, AMERICAN WOMEN: THREE DECADES OF CHANGE (1983); P. ENGLAND &
G. FORKAS supra note 79 at 147-77.
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women, the expectation value of marriage (and of any foregone
opportunites to marry) must be discounted by higher rates of
divorce.92 Accordingly, while many women continue to rely on
marriage to secure a standard of living greater than they could
provide on their own, and many men continue to rely on wealth
in securing more favorable marriages, 93 the value of marriage is
less than in societies where divorce is rare, and divorcing couples
are better able to mitigate their losses than they were in more
traditional societies.
94
At the same time that the lost opportunity to marry another
(and with it the expectation interest in marriage) has grown less
important, the importance of another aspect of the reliance
interest in marriage-the loss of career opportunities-has cor-
respondingly increased. In times of old, women's income oppor-
tunities were limited, and thus the career opportunities foregone
in the interests of marriage were relatively unimportant. Today,
those opportunities are substantial. Virtually all women could
work outside the home if they chose and, increasing numbers of
women work during long periods of their marriage. To the
extent marriage persuades women (and some men) to forego
career opportunities, they are more likely to do so to further the
other spouses' career or to participate in child rearing and other
household activities.95 Upon divorce, the benefiting spouse
92. This means that given two identical couples, one in a society where divorce is
common and the other in a society where divorce is rare, the expected duration of the
marriage at the time of its inception would be less in the first society. The expected value of
any alternative marriage would also be less. Accordingly, to the extent spousal support is
intended to compensate for foregone opportunities to marry, one would expect support
levels to become much lower as the value of the foregone opportunities decline. Even using
expectation measures, one would expect shorter term support awards as the incidence of
divorce increases and the expected duration of the marriage decreases. See generally
Cooter & Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1432, 1445
(1985).
This does not necessarily mean, however, that if divorce is common, no compensation
can be awarded. Higher divorce rates may reflect laws which impose no penalty for
divorce. Higher levels of compensation may be justified by a societal decision to discourage
divorce. See supra note 73 and infra note 173.
93. Becker, A Theory of Marriage, in ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY: MARRIAGE,
CHILDREN, AND HUMAN CAPITAL 307, 314 (T. Schultz ed. 1974).
94. Indeed, one suspects that the ability of women to support themselves and the
societal insistence that they do so is the single biggest change underlying alimony awards.
L. WErrzMAN, supra note 5, at 33.
95. See, e.g., Prager, Sharing Principles and the Future of Marital Property Law, 25
UCLA L. REv. 1 (1977); Weitzman, supra note 44, at 1211. "Even though both spouses
may have worked during the marriage, it is likely that, as a marital unit, they have chosen
to give priority to one spouse's career in the expectation that both will share in the benefits
of that decision." Id.; see also Olsen, supra note 7, at 1533 & n. 132 (citing Gillespie, Who
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retains the advantages of an enhanced career or properly raised
children, while the contributing spouse suffers a unilateral loss.
9 6
Lost career opportunities, however, unlike lost opportuni-
ties to marry, do not necessarily mirror the expectation interest
in marriage. While married couples necessarily forego opportu-
nities to marry others, they need not forego career opportunities.
To the extent that one spouse chooses to make such a sacrifice,
he or she presumably does so because the additional benefits for
the children, the expected advances in the other spouse's career,
or an enhanced family life justifies the loss. 9 7 It is the value of
Has the Power? The Marital Struggle, in FAMILY, MARRIAGE, AND THE STRUGGLE OF
THE SEXES 121-50 (H. Dreitzel ed. 1972)); Atkin, supra note 26, at 342; see generally
Younger, supra note 17.
96. See Benham, Benefits of Women's Education Within Marriage, in ECONOMICS OF
THE FAMILY: MARRIAGE, CHILDREN AND HUMAN CAPITAL 375 (T. Schultz, ed. 1974).
Another way of viewing this change is to focus on the nature of wives' interest in their
husbands' careers. So long as women had few opportunities to pursue careers of their own,
their access to any substantial career-and the income associated with it---came through
marriage. With women now enjoying the opportunity to pursue careers of their own, those
who choose to forego such opportunities often do so as part of a conscious decision that the
husband's career is sufficient to support the family. Even though the woman's contribution
to her husband's career may be the same in both cases, there is a greater inclination in
modern cases, where women have foregone opportunities of their own, to view the
husband's career as "theirs," rather than "his." We believe that it is the change in the
nature of the reliance that is primarily responsible for this, and that (more so than in earlier
societies) these career investments may generate the most important forms of wealth. See
generally Krauskopf, supra note 47.
97. Indeed, the basis for compensation in these cases can be best explained in terms of
the family's investment decisions. As Professor Krauskopf explained (drawing on the
economics of the family literature) the family may be viewed as a firm, making investment
decisions in a manner designed to maximize family utility. See Krauskopf, supra note 47,
at 386. When husband and wife decide, for example, that the wife will support the husband
through medical school, the couple presumably concludes that the expected return from
the husband's medical education is more valuable to them than the alternative uses of the
wife's time or money. If the divorce occurs shortly after his graduation from medical
school and no compensation is awarded, he will reap the full benefit of an investment they
jointly undertook and jointly paid for.
Similarly, if the couple decides that the wife will forego her career opportunities to
raise the children, and the divorce occurs when the children have reached the age of
majority, if no compensation is provided, both spouses will continue to enjoy the benefits
from having had children, but the cost of that endeavor will be borne only by the wife.
In this sense, spousal support-or property adjustments-should be primarily
designed to compensate for accidents of timing. If the family decides to enjoy a benefit
during the present, financed by costs borne in the future, or to endure sacrifices in the
present in order to reap benefits in the future, divorce may arbitrarily reassign who will
bear the costs and who will reap the benefits the couple originally expected to share.
Professor Krauskopf has made a major contribution to the discussion by using the concept
of human capital to describe the career decisions involved. Within this framework, spousal
support would then serve to correct the resulting inequities in much the same way courts
assign responsibility for more traditional factors such as car payments.
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these additional benefits, not the total value of the marriage or
the level of support provided, 98 that corresponds most closely to
this form of reliance.99
Protection of lost career opportunities, therefore, creates
different implications for the allocations made at divorce.
Although both spouses forego the opportunity to marry others,
requiring a choice between their competing reliance losses, typi-
cally only one spouse forgoes career opportunities for the benefit
of the other. Compensation for these foregone opportunities,
therefore, does not depend on a lifelong commitment to mar-
riage,100 or on a determination of responsibility for the marital
breakup. Rather, the compensation depends on the nature of
each spouse's contribution to the marriage, 101 with the best mea-
98. After a longer term marriage with a permanent career sacrifice, however, the
appropriate measure of compensation may become the level of support enjoyed during the
marriage. If he temporarily interrupts his career to facilitate her transfer to a higher paying
job in another city, the exchange will involve his delayed career advancement in return for
the higher standard of living he anticipates from her transfer. After twenty years of
marriage, he will have enjoyed that return and will have been able to resume his career. If,
however, he permanently foregoes his career opportunities to contribute to her career and
the children, after twenty years of marriage, the loss will be a continuing one for which he
will not have been fully compensated, and the level of support he enjoys during the
marriage may be the easiest measure to employ.
99. Fuller and Perdue justified use of the expectation measure as a surrogate for
reliance principally because in most contracts expectation is easier to calculate. See supra
notes 73-74 and accompanying text. For many of the calculations involved here, however,
reliance may be easier to calculate. Foregone career opportunities, for example, may be
much easier to value than a particular child rearing practice or children generally and
presumably the couple will value the benefit-children raised by a parent-at least as
much as the foregone income. The supporting spouse's financial contribution to a medical
degree may also be a more certain measure than the determination of his or her share of the
income made possible by the degree. If the legal principle to be employed is disgorgement
of the benefit retained beyond the end of the marriage, reliance may be a surrogate for
restitution in this context. See infra note 104.
100. If marriage does not involve a lifelong commitment, and the parties are obliged
to remain together only so long as they are both in love, see supra text accompanying note
53, then it is difficult to claim reliance on the hope that the marriage will endure. Similarly,
the concept of "fault" depends on a commitment to stay married absent activity by one
spouse incompatible with the continuation of the marriage. If either spouse has a right to
leave, then it is difficult to characterize the decision to seek the divorce as breach of the
marital agreement. See infra note 166.
Some of the difficulty in determining fault stems from the fact that the behavior
necessary, in a popular sense, to justify a decision terminating the marriage is not so
egregious-and therefore not so clear cut-as it once was. This difficulty is compounded
by laws which continue to impose terms on couples choosing to marry which may or may
not reflect their individual agreements. See infra discussion at notes 115-16.
101. The principle of compensation for contributions to the marriage does not require
a tally of every marital service performed. See Cornelius v. Cornelius, 382 So. 2d 710, 714-
15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (rejecting such a principle). As Professor Kay points out, the
original proposals made for the recognition of homemakers' contributions to the family
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sure for the loss being not the level of support enjoyed during the
marriage, but some lesser amount, generally tied to the extent of
the sacrifice. 10 2 In addition, this compensation should not termi-
nate upon remarriage since the opportunity lost (career advance-
ment) is not recaptured upon remarriage.1 3 The loss, however,
should be subject to mitigation through subsequent employment.
While valuation is inherently problematic, 104 "rehabilitative" ali-
mony, which was designed primarily to compensate for this type
of loss, sidesteps the issue by characterizing the amount of ali-
mony as that necessary to secure appropriate education or
concerned contributions to the acquisition of marital property, not a claim of compensation
for services rendered. Kay, supra note 58, at 50-51. Rather, the issue arises when one
spouse has made a significant contribution to the marriage in expectation of a future return
which will not be realized because of the divorce. The doctor's spouse who contributed to
medical training twenty years ago has presumably enjoyed the benefits from the family's
enhanced income. See, e.g., Martin v. Martin, 358 N.W.2d 793, 799 (S.D. 1984). The
doctor divorcing a supporting spouse upon graduation from medical school is depriving
that spouse of any opportunity to enjoy the fruits of what may have been a considerable
investment. See, e.g., O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712 (1985). But see
Hodge v. Hodge, 513 Pa. 264, 520 A.2d 15 (1986); Drapek v. Drapek, 399 Mass. 240, 503
N.E.2d 946 (1987).
102. There is no reason to assume that, but for marriage, both spouses would have
earned comparable incomes. But see supra note 98 and infra notes 134-36, 141-50 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the "extent of sacrifice" valuation, see infra note
104.
103. As Sackett and Munyon have observed, "[i]f a wife's alimony award is to make
her a productive person and compensate her for the years she devoted to the marriage and
did not advance in her career, then what valid reason is there for termination of the award
on remarriage?" Sackett & Munyon, supra note 61, at 309. See, eg., In re Marriage of
Orgren, 375 N.W.2d 710 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985).
This should be subject, however, to the principle that spousal support is not designed
to put the divorced spouse in a position better than the position possible if the marriage had
continued. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 75-80. As a practical matter, where
rehabilitative alimony is being used to pursue further education or training, it should
continue irrespective of remarriage until the education or training is completed. Where the
spouse is not pursuing such "rehabilitation," and the support from the second marriage
replaces that from the first, the spousal support should end. See infra note 178 and
accompanying text. Cf BURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] art. 1575 (1976), cited in
Erickson, Support Toward the Realization of Educational Goals: How the Law Can Ensure
Reciprocity, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 947, 948 & n.6; O'Kelly, supra note 63, at 260.
104. A major question exists, of course, of whether the determination should focus on
disgorgement of the benefit conferred or compensation for the change in position in reliance
on the continuation of the marriage. Although we intend to pursue this issue further in a
subsequent article, for present purposes we have concluded only that (1) it is enough that
some benefit has been conferred, (2) valuation of both the benefit and loss are problematic,
and (3) the ability of the other spouse to pay imposes a limit in any event. We believe that,
in making the decisions, the initial inquiry should be on whether further education or
training will enable the spouse to earn a living commensurate with the standard of living
enjoyed during the marriage. If not, then long term alimony may be appropriate. See infra
notes 105, 135-36, 177-78, 185-87; see also Krauskopf, supra note 47, at 391-93, 397-98.
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employment for the recipient spouse. 05
In modem marriages the reliance interest has become more
complex. It embraces a lost opportunity to marry someone else,
valued differently for different people during different times dur-
ing the marriage, 10 6 together with sacrifices in career develop-
ment that would never have been an issue in a society of single
career families. 10 7 In response to these two different forms of
105. Indeed, the response in some states has been to eliminate permanent alimony
altogether. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1512 (1981 & Supp. 1987); IND. CODE
ANN. § 31-1-11.5-11 (Bums 1987), imposing limits on the duration of alimony awards; see
also infra note 177 for a discussion of lump sum alimony. We believe this is inappropriate.
Even if spousal support is intended only to compensate for lost career opportunities, there
will be many women, divorced after long term marriages, who cannot realistically expect to
support themselves in a manner commensurate with the career opportunities they forewent
in their youth. See, eg., Forster v. Forster, 436 So. 2d 966 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); In re
Marriage of Hitchcock, 309 N.W.2d 432, 437-38 (Iowa 1981); infra note 178. This is
particularly true for older women and those who have become disabled over the course of
the marriage. Even if they would have become disabled anyway, they may have enjoyed
substantially greater disability benefits if they had been employed. See discussion in Sackett
& Munyon, supra note 62, at 317-19; L. WErrZMAN, supra note 5, ch. 7, passim.
In addition, some states award "transitional alimony" to ease the change in lifestyles.
See, eg., Murray v. Murray, 374 So. 2d 622, 624 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979). Transitional
alimony, in its purest form, compensates for change in lifestyle over the course of the
marriage. See supra note 80.
106. The opportunity costs after a short marriage are likely to be small since any
career sacrifice is likely to be remedial, and the marriage itself is unlikely to have had a
significant impact on the prospects for remarriage. Women under thirty, for example, have
a 75% chance of remarriage. L. WErrZMAN, supra note 5, at 204.
107. Modem marriages present three possible patterns. In a two career family in
which the husband and wife share household responsibilities at least to the degree that
neither career has suffered from those responsibilities, both spouses experience the same
reliance loss-the lost opportunity to be married to someone with an income similar to that
of their mate. The opportunity cost for the woman, however, while identical in nature to
her husband's, is likely to be higher in degree because the income she has foregone from
other marriages is likely to be greater than the income he forewent, and her prospects for
remarriage will be poorer than his. See supra notes 79, 83.
In a traditional marriage where the wife does not work outside the home, both spouses
will have experienced the same lost opportunity to marry described above, but the wife also
will have foregone whatever career opportunities she possessed. So long as women
generally earn less than men and the particular woman's career prospects are speculative,
the financial value of her foregone marital prospects will ordinarily be greater than her
foregone career prospects.
In those marriages where both spouses work but she interrupts her career to take care
of the children or he foregoes a career enhancing transfer that would interfere with her
career development, there may be substantial opportunity costs. Both spouses forego the
opportunity to marry described above, with this effect again being greater the longer the
marriage and, on average, a greater loss for women than for men. In addition, spouses
foregoing their own career advancement to further the marriage are in a worse financial
position than they would have been in had they never married. Women continue to be
statistically more likely to sacrifice career development to care for children or to advance
their husband's careers, though not to the same degree as in more traditional societies. In
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reliance, two different, though potentially overlapping, systems
of compensation emerge. One is tied to compensation for breach
of a lifelong commitment to marriage; the other only requires
recognition of the contributions made.1° 8 One form of compen-
sation terminates with remarriage; the other continues. 0 9 Either
can be expanded to include many of the elements of the other,
but neither could ever completely replace the other without
doing violence to its underlying rationale.' 10 Since the advent of
no fault divorce, states have been groping toward one system or
the other, often losing sight of the road not taken."' The next
section of the article will examine the allocations currently made
upon divorce, charting the coexistence of the two systems and
the interests that become lost in between.
III. Two ROADS DIVERGE: THE TRANSITION
To No FAULT
The movement toward no fault divorce occurred contempo-
raneously with these changes in the nature of the reliance inter-
est in marriage. 112 So long as a determination of fault was a
necessary part of divorce and lost opportunities to marry consti-
addition, women continue to be more likely to perform the major share of housework,
limiting their time for other pursuits. See V. FuCHs, supra note 5, at 127; M. GLENDON,
supra note 5, at 130, 132; Frug, supra note 65, at 57; Karst, Women's Constitution, 1984
DUKE L.J. 447, 459; O'Donovan, Should All Maintenance be Abolished?, 45 MOD. L. REV.
424, 430 (1982); Schultz, supra note 36, at 271; see also Project, Law Firms and Lawyers
with Children: An Empirical Analysis of Family/Work Conflicts, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1263,
1274-75 (1982).
108. See supra notes 85-88, 101-02, and accompanying text.
109. Remarriage, of course, recaptures the opportunity lost so long as the second
marriage offers advantages similar to the opportunities available at the time of the first
marriage (and we have concluded that, in most cases, those opportunities can be estimated
by the advantages offered by the first marriage). See supra note 72. When alimony was tied
to a reaffirmation of marital obligations, it terminated upon remarriage because the new
marriage was incompatible with the continuation of the old obligations. To the extent
modern alimony is designed to compensate either for the benefits lost with the end of the
marriage or for the lost opportunity to marry well, it should terminate with remarriage
only if the second marriage provides support comparable to that provided by the first
marriage. See supra note 103 and infra note 178.
110. See infra text accompanying notes 125-27, 133-36 & 184.
111. There are, in fact, three possible roads. The first is to require proof of fault as a
precondition for alimony. See, eg., Dyer v. Tsapis, 249 S.E.2d 509 (W. Va. 1978); see also
infra note 125. The second is to preclude consideration of fault. See, eg., In re Marriage of
Peterson, 227 N.W.2d 139, 142 (Iowa 1975); In re Marriage of Williams, 199 N.W.2d 339,
345 (Iowa 1972); see also infra note 132. The third is to permit, but not require,
consideration of fault. See, eg., F.C. v. I.V.C., 300 S.E.2d 99, 101 (W. Va. 1982); see also
infra note 129.
112. For a discussion of the movement toward no fault divorce, see generally L.
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tuted the most important part of reliance, the allocations made
upon divorce were logically tied to the determination of fault.'
13
With the advent of no fault divorce, however, states had to con-
sider anew whether consideration of marital conduct (or miscon-
duct) continued to serve the interests at stake upon divorce, and
if it did, whether the role of such considerations was sufficiently
important to outweigh the administrative costs involved.1 4 The
states have split in answering that question. In the process, any
reevaluation of the role of alimony has been obscured as changes
in the theory and process of divorce have become confused with
changes in the nature of wives' dependence on their husbands.
In examining the course states have followed since adopting
no fault divorce, it is important to emphasize that the introduc-
tion of no fault grounds for granting divorces changed the
rationale for alimony and other forms of support without neces-
sarily precluding consideration of marital conduct altogether.
"No fault" divorce represented, as much as anything else, rebel-
lion against the propriety of specific performance of marital obli-
gations. In traditional societies, the vow "until death do us
part" was made first to God, then to the state, and only tertiarily
to the other spouse.1' 5 The couple could not terminate the mar-
riage or vary its terms. 16 The determination of fault necessary
WEITZMAN, supra note 5; Friedman, supra note 5; see also supra notes 55-56 and
accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 23-27, 85-89 and accompanying text; see also M. GLENDON,
supra note 5, at 53; Krauskopf, supra note 47, at 396; Ploscowe, Alimony, 383 ANNALS 22
(1969); Comment, The Fault Preclusion to Post-Divorce Alimony in Louisiana, 57 TuL. L.
REV. 351, 352-53 (1982). For a discussion of the impact of no fault divorce on alimony, see
Wallace v. Wallace, 46 Md. App. 213, 416 A.2d 1317 (1980); Clark, Divorce Policy and
Divorce Reform, 42 U. COLO. L. REv. 403, 410 (1971).
114. The administrative costs involved in the determination of fault are substantial
and they provided a major impetus toward no fault divorce. See generally Friedman, supra
note 5; Neuner, supra note 23; see also infra notes 157-67 and accompanying text.
115. For a discussion of the centrality of God in Catholic marriage, see Robinson,
Unresolved Questions in the Theology of Marriage, 43 JURIST 69 (1983). For a discussion of
state regulation of marriage, see Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1887):
[B]ut when the contract to marry is executed by the marriage, a relation between
the parties is created which they cannot change. Other contracts may be modified,
restricted, or enlarged, or entirely released upon the consent of the parties. Not
so with marriage. The relation once formed, the law steps in and holds the parties
to various obligations and liabilities.
.Td. at 211; see also Walton v. Walton, 28 Cal. App. 3d 108, 104 Cal. Rptr. 472 (1972);
Fearon v. Treanor, 272 N.Y. 268, 272-73, 5 N.E.2d 815, 816 (1936), appeal dismissed, 301
U.S. 667 (1937); Clark, supra note 108, at 407 n.23. See generally Shultz, supra note 36, at
268 & n.224.
116. See generally supra notes 17, 115 and infra note 171.
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to justify dissolution of the marriage served to release the inno-
cent spouse from his or her marital obligations without absolv-
ing the mate.117  The allocations made upon divorce thus
involved a form of specific performance: continuation of the
guilty husband's obligation of support, the innocent wife's care
for the children, and the husband's rights over jointly acquired
property. 1
18
"No fault" divorce resulted from the transformation of
marriage from an indissolvable union consecrated by God to an
exchange of promises primarily involving the two individuals
and their children. Assignment of responsibility for the marital
breakup became unnecessary when the state no longer mandated
that the union last forever in order to protect societal interests
transcending the particular family.1 9 With a societal judgment
that divorce was preferable to unhappy or involuntary unions,
specific performance of marital rights and duties became inap-
propriate. No fault divorce requires recognition of the right of
either party to terminate the union.1 20 The allocations made
upon such divorces must therefore flow from the cessation, not
the reaffirmation of marital responsibilities.
While no fault divorce thus rendered the traditional ration-
ale for alimony incompatible with the new grounds for divorce,
it supplied no alternative rationale to guide the financial alloca-
tions made upon divorce. "No fault" grounds altered only the
view of marriage as indissolvable; it did not preclude compensa-
tion for abdication of marital responsibilities nor mandate a par-
ticular balance between the parties' competing interests.
In deciding whether to permit consideration of marital mis-
conduct, then, the states had to first define the interests they
were trying to protect. West Virginia provides one of the most
considered opinions for the retention of fault as a prerequisite
for alimony. In Dyer v. Tsapis,1 21 the state supreme court, wres-
tling with the role of fault in West Virginia's recently adopted no
fault system, observed:
117. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 25-27, 35, 40-41 and accompanying text.
119. Compare L. WEITZMAN, supra note 5, at 4, with L. WEITZMAN, supra note 5, at
26-28; see also Neuner, supra note 23. See generally supra note 115.
120. M. GLENDON, supra note 5, at 4; L. WEITZMAN, supra note 5, at 26-28; Clark,
The New Marriage, 12 WILLIAMETrE L. Rnv. 441, 444 (1976). In this sense, marriage has
become very much like a contract or a partnership. Either party is free to terminate the
agreement. The legal issue is limited to one of damages. See infra note 159.
121. 249 S.E.2d 509 (W. Va. 1978).
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Once all divorces, like all tort actions, were predicated upon a
legal wrong; alimony, like tort damages, served both punitive
and compensatory purposes. Now, increasingly, divorces are
awarded on no-fault grounds and awards of alimony, like con-
tract damages, increasingly emphasize restitution to the exclu-
sion of punishment. The law which once saw marriage as a
sacrament now conceptualizes it as roughly analogous to a
business partnership. As might be expected in the midst of such
change, there is tension between the old and new approaches.
On the one hand there is a powerful incentive to punish a
wrongdoer and an even more powerful aversion to rewarding
one. On the other hand, there is an appreciation of the value of
a wife's sacrifice of the opportunity to obtain skills, advance-
ment, and retirement benefits. In addition, a woman of
advanced age is likely to experience difficulty in finding another
suitable partner. Reluctantly, and possibly because of the diffi-
culty of determining fault in the context of a complex interper-
sonal relationship, we have shifted the focus of the divorce
inquiry from fault evidence to more dignified and reliable eco-
nomic evidence. Nonetheless, the more modem approach must
be alloyed with the more ancient.
122
In line with that "more ancient approach," the court required
the spouse seeking alimony to show that the other spouse was
guilty of "a significant wrong supported by a preponderance of
the evidence in the record." 123 While the opinion acknowledged
the compensatory purposes of alimony and the difficulty of
proof, the court emphasized that "[t]o exclude consideration of
misconduct altogether... would convert this statute to a pure
no-fault procedure, with an attendant inequitable redistribution
of wealth."' 124 It concluded that "a totally blameless party can
never be charged with alimony."
' 125
122. Id. at 510-12.
123. Id. at 512.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 513. West Virginia appears to have been the last state to require proof of
fault as a prerequisitie for alimony. In some states, however, fault on the part of the
recipient spouse precludes alimony. See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-1 (1987); IDAHO CODE
§ 32-705 (1983); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 160 (West Supp. 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-
16.6 (1987) (adultery only); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-130 (Law Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1986)
(adultery only); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1 (1983 & Supp. 1987). In practice, the fault
required to disqualify the recipient spouse must be sufficient to constitute fault grounds for
divorce. See, e.g., Wallace v. Wallace, I Va. App. 183, 187, 336 S.E.2d 27, 29 (1985):
The trial court did not err in denying Mr. Wallace's motion to require Mrs.
Wallace and Rogers to answer the questions posed to them regarding adultery.
The record amply supports the court's opinion that it was Mr. Wallace's own
fault and misconduct that caused the termination of the marriage. Assuming
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The West Virginia court, in defining the role of fault, effec-
tively embraced a system designed to protect lost opportunities
to marry at the expense of a system capable of protecting lost
career opportunities. As we explained above, both parties neces-
sarily forego other possible partners in entering marriage; yet,
there is no way to establish whether another marriage would
have occurred at all, lasted as long, or provided the same mate-
rial advantages. Protection of this form of reliance, therefore,
requires both a choice between the spouses' divergent interests
and recognition of a right to continue enjoying the benefits
promised by the marriage. 126 The West Virginia Supreme Court
correctly concluded that without an obligation to remain mar-
ried and a determination of responsibility for the breakup of the
marriage, there was no basis for long-term alimony based on one
spouse's superior earning capacity. 127 What the decision over-
looked was the increasing need to protect other forms of reliance
as well.
In many ways, the most important aspect of the Dyer rule
may be that it lasted little more than three years. In FC. v.
L VC.,128 the West Virginia Supreme Court modified Dyer to
hold that "[a] voluntary separation alimony award is not condi-
tioned on a finding of fault, but the court may inquire into fault
to decide whether alimony is appropriate.... Concrete financial
realities of the parties must be a court's primary inquiry in any
alimony award."'' 29  Subsequent West Virginia decisions have
arguendo that her answers would have been incriminatory, Mr. Wallace,
nonetheless, could have asserted the doctrine of recrimination and prevented her
husband from obtaining a fault divorce. The questions posed were simply
immaterial. With neither party entitled to a fault divorce, the obligation to
support a spouse continues.
126. This is consistent with a "contract" approach, awarding expectation damages as
compensation for breach. The court's use of the word "contract" is, however, unclear since
it appears to equate consideration of "fault" with "punishment," and with tort principles
rather than contract principles. See infra note 166.
127. If both parties are free to leave, there is no basis for alimony designed solely to
compensate for the lost opportunity to marry someone with a larger income. See supra text
accompanying notes 95-105 for a discussion of the other possible bases for spousal support.
128. 300 S.E.2d 99 (W. Va. 1982).
129. Id. at 101 (emphasis in original). State statutes which appear to permit, but not
require, consideration of fault, include: ALA. CODE § 30-2-51 (1975 & Supp. 1987); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 46b-82 (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08 (West 1985) (must be considered
for adultery); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-106B (1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
208, § 34 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.335(2)(7) (1986); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 93-5-23 (1973 & Supp. 1987); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (1987) (except in no-
fault divorces, when impermissible); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 507 (Purdon 1955 &
Supp. 1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16 (1981 & Supp. 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-5-
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implemented the modification, tying alimony to the parties'
finances unless the wife's responsibility for the divorce makes
such an award inequitable. 130  While the courts have not
addressed the rationale underlying these awards, the effect of
their allocations is to supplement a system designed to protect
lost opportunities to marry with one capable of recognizing
career sacrifices. Unless both parties have worked without
restriction or interruption throughout the marriage, most mar-
riages will involve some form of career sacrifice inuring to the
benefit of the spouse with the higher income at the time of the
separation. Accordingly, at divorce, the sacrificing spouse
should be compensated unless there is an offsetting injury to the
mate. Alimony should not be conditioned on a finding of fault
because the reasons for the marital dissolution are irrelevant to
the principle of restitution for the sacrifice made or benefit con-
ferred. Rather, courts may consider fault in determining
whether the paying spouse has suffered an injury which should
be offset against the restitution owed. The West Virginia courts
have arrived at the conclusions suggested by this analysis with-
out acknowledging any rationale capable of justifying the out-
comes. The result is poorly articulated decisions that provide
little guidance for the future.
13 1
The courts in states precluding any consideration of fault
have had to justify spousal support more directly. Oregon is
characteristic of these states in declaring that "[t]he most signifi-
cant factor.., is whether the supported spouse is employable at
an income that will allow enjoyment of a standard of living not
overly disproportionate to that which would have been enjoyed
had the marriage not been dissolved." 132 Where the spouse is
101 (1984 & Supp. 1987); see also Sweet v. Sweet, 190 Conn. 657, 462 A.2d 1031 (1983)
(court must consider the causes for the dissolution of the marriage); Cornelius v. Cornelius,
382 So. 2d 710, 714 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (consideration of fault only allowed in some
circumstances); Cole v. Cole, 384 N.W.2d 312, 316 (S.D. 1986); Courie v. Courie, 341
S.E.2d 646 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986); Bangs v. Bangs, 59 Md. App. 350, 475 A.2d 1214, 1223
(1984); Massey v. Massey, 621 S.W.2d 728 (Tenn. 1981); Hanks v. Hanks, 296 N.W.2d
523, 527 (S.D. 1980); Peterson v. Peterson, 242 N.W.2d 103, 108 (Minn. 1976); Chapman
v. Chapman, 498 S.W.2d 134 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973); Kay, supra note 58, at 72-74 n.363; see
also supra note 125.
130. See Nutter v. Nutter, 327 S.E.2d 160 (W. Va. 1985); Crutchfield v. Crutchfield,
302 S.E.2d 76, 77 (W. Va. 1983); see also Duncan v. Duncan, 686 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1984); Hanks v. Hanks, 296 N.W.2d 523, 527-28 (S.D. 1980).
131. See infra discussion at note 151.
132. See Kitson v. Kitson, 17 Or. App. 648, 655-57, 523 P.2d 575, 579 (1974) (cited
in In re Marriage of Auld, 72 Or. App. 747, 697 P.2d 220 (1985)); see also De Cenzo v. De
Cenzo, 433 So. 2d 1316, 1318 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) ("The two primary elements to be
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not, the Oregon courts have been willing to award spousal sup-
port regardless of fault, with the amount and the duration of the
support varying with the length of the marriage and the respec-
tive financial positions of the parties.
1 33
In justifying spousal support in these cases, the Oregon
courts have, in effect, adopted a compensatory theory of support,
tying alimony to the loss of career opportunities caused by the
marriage without providing protection for the losses associated
with the foregone opportunities to marry others.1 34 In articulat-
ing such a theory, however, the courts have had to acknowledge
that many women, had they fully pursued the careers available
in their youth, would have been able to earn no more than a
fraction of the income enjoyed by their husbands. The Oregon
courts sidestepped this difficulty, explaining:
[A]t least until recent years, young women entering marriage
were led to believe-if not expressly by their husbands-to-be,
certainly implicitly by the entire culture in which they had
come to maturity-that they need not develop any special skills
or abilities beyond those necessary to homemaking and child
care, because their husbands, if they married, would provide
their financial support and security. We cannot hold that
women who relied on that assurance, regardless of whether
they sacrificed any specific career plans of their own when they
considered when determining permanent periodic alimony are the needs of one spouse for
the funds and the ability of the other spouse to provide the necessary funds."); accord In re
Marriage of Hitchcock, 309 N.W.2d 432, 436-37 (Iowa 1981); see also infra note 137.
Other state statutes precluding consideration of fault are: ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.160(3)
(1983); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-319(B) (1976 & Supp. 1987); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 14-10-114(2) (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1512(c) (1981 & Supp. 1987); ILL. STAT.
ANN. ch. 40, para. 504(b) (Smith-Hurd 1980); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-203(2) (1987);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.09.090(1) (1986); see also Kay, supra note 58, at 72-74
n.363.
133. See, e.g., Hayner v. Hayner, 58 Or. App. 324, 329, 648 P.2d 379, 381 (1982) ("In
the dissolution of a marriage of substantial duration, the objective is that the parties
separate on as equal a basis as possible.").
In shorter term marriages, courts are reluctant to award alimony, irrespective of
differences in income, unless a spouse can show that the marriage itself significantly
affected earning capacity. See In re Marriage of Auld, 72 Or. App. 747, 697 P.2d 220
(1985); In re Marriage of Koch, 58 Or. App. 252, 648 P.2d 406 (1982); In re Marriage of
Lemke, 289 Or. 145, 149, 611 P.2d 295, 297 (1980) (alimony denied because "there is no
indication and no reason to infer that the wife's earning capacity was adversely affected by
the marriage."). For an example of an intermediate length marriage, see In re Marriage of
Bevers, 326 N.W.2d 896, 900 (Iowa 1982) (ten year marriage, rehabilitative alimony
awarded for two years); Murray v. Murray, 374 So. 2d 622 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); see
also L. WErrzMAN, supra note 5, at 168-71.
134. See, e.g., In re Marriage of McRight, 52 Or. App. 785, 788, 629 P.2d 865, 867
(1981).
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married, must as a matter of principle be limited to the stan-
dard of living they can provide for themselves if "employed in a
job commensurate with [their] skills and abilities." The mar-
riage itself may well have prevented the development of those
skills and abilities.' 35
The Oregon courts thus premise spousal support in longer term
marriages on compensation for lost career opportunities even
where there is no evidence that the career foregone would have
resulted in as much income as the support award.
136
The West Virginia and Oregon courts have rejected the
traditional fault based system without completing the new ana-
lytical framework. They agree that fault-and the principle of
compensation for the injuries flowing from breach of marital
obligations-is no longer sufficient to protect the interests impli-
cated in marriage and divorce. Both, therefore, declare that
financial need should be the primary consideration in granting
spousal support.137  But need alone is of little value in assessing
support awards. If it were, the almost universal importance of
the length of the marriage on the amount and duration of the
award would be difficult to explain 138 and fault would indeed be
135. Grove v. Grove, 280 Or. 341, 351-52, 571 P.2d 477, 485 (1977) (cited in In re
Marriage of Yantis, 52 Or. App. 825, 629 P.2d 883 (1981)). The Florida courts, which
consider fault only in limited circumstances, have arrived at a similar conclusion. See Stiff
v. Stiff, 395 So. 2d 573, 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Lash v. Lash, 307 So. 2d 241, 243
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); see also Erickson, supra note 103, at 957.
136. Florida provides the clearest example of such reasoning. In Stiff v. Stiff, 395 So.
2d 573 (Fla. App. 1981), a labor market analyst appearing for the husband "testified that if
the wife had gone to work 25 years ago and was good in her career, she would be making
approximately $17,000 per year at the present time." Id. at 574. The trial court concluded,
however, that the wife needed $25,000 a year to maintain the standard of living she enjoyed
during the marriage, and that the husband, who had earned $87,200 in 1979, could afford
to pay that much support. The appellate court, while using compensatory language,
emphasized the wife's inability to maintain her standard of living and reversed the lower
court award of rehabilitative alimony, substituting an award of permanent periodic
alimony.
137. See supra notes 129, 132.
UMDA § 308, 9A U.L.A. 347 (1973) suggests that the court shall award maintenance
only when necessary to meet "reasonable needs" of the person seeking maintenance; see
also Sullivan v. Sullivan, 134 Cal. App. 3d 484, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1982); In re Marriage of
McVey, 641 P.2d 300, 301 (Colo. App. 1981); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801(a) (Deering 1984);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-114(1) (1987); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 504(2) (Smith-
Hurd 1980). See generally M. GLENDON, supra note 5, at 55; Atkin, supra note 26, at 336;
Note, Domestic Relations: Consideration of Enhanced Earning Capacity of Recently
Educated Spouse in Divorce Settlements, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 901 (1981).
138. Let us take, for example, two women, both age 40 at divorce, both working as
secretaries earning $16,000 per year, both with former spouses earning $80,000 a year. If
need alone were the criterion for spousal support, one would expect equal awards.
Nonetheless, if one had been married for 20 years, and the other for 2 years, one would
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irrelevant.'39
In West Virginia and other states that permit but do not
require consideration of marital misconduct, the issue of redefin-
ing the role of fault is critical. If his misconduct does not guar-
antee alimony, while her fault does not preclude it, how much
emphasis is placed on such evidence? Is the definition of marital
misconduct the same as that necessary to justify divorce? Where
fault is not established or both parties share responsibility for the
marital breakup, what is the justification for the award? Is the
justification the same in states that preclude consideration of
fault? West Virginia is only just beginning to answer these
questions. 14
In Oregon and the other states that preclude consideration
of fault, the issues are more fundamental. What is the jurispru-
dential basis for awards of alimony divorced from consideration
of marital misconduct?141 In articulating a theory of compensa-
expect major differences in the awards. We believe the differences can be explained by the
fact that opportunities foregone over the course of a 20 year marriage are much greater
than those foregone during a two year marriage. See supra note 133. The following statutes
require consideration of the duration of marriage as a factor in awards of spousal support:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-319(b)(2) (1976 & Supp. 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-
114(2)(d) (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-82 (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 1512(c)(4) (1981 & Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN § 61.08(2)(b) (West 1985); GA. CODE
ANN. § 19-6-1 (1987); HAw. REV. STAT. § 580-47 (1987); IDAHO CODE § 32-705(2)(c)
(1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 504(b)(4) (Smith-Hurd 1980); IOWA CODE
§ 598.21(1)(a) (1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.200(2)(d) (Baldwin 1983); MD. FAM.
LAW CODE ANN. § 11-106(b)(4) (1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 34 (West
Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.552(2)(d) (West Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 452.235(2)(4) (Vernon 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-203(2)(d) (1987); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:34-23 (west Supp. 1987); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.18(b)(5) (Baldwin
1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105(d)(A) (Supp. 1986); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 752 (1985 &
Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1(4) (1983 & Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.09.090(1)(d) (1986); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-16(b)(1) (1986); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 767.26(1) (1981).
139. For states continuing to permit consideration of marital misconduct in the
award of spousal support, see supra notes 125, 129. For a discussion of the role fault can be
expected to play, see infra notes 179-84 and accompanying text.
140. In Crutchfield v. Crutchfield, 302 S.E.2d 76 (W. Va. 1983), for example, the
court reversed a lower court decision which based a denial of alimony on the fact that the
husband was guilty of no inequitable conduct. The appellate court then recited the parties'
respective financial circumstances, noting that the wife had not worked outside the home
during the twenty-seven years of marriage. Yet, the court failed to suggest a framework for
determining the amount of alimony other than pointing out the wife's obvious need. See
also Nutter v. Nutter, 327 S.E.2d 160 (W. Va. 1985).
141. After all, if marriage is terminable at will, and marital support obligations end
upon divorce, what is the justification for imposing a continued financial relationship upon
the parties? The two major justifications involve either the idea of compensation for the
poorer spouse's sacrifices and contributions to the marriage, see, eg., supra note 135, or the
idea that both spouses should share increases in earning capacity acquired throughout the
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tion for lost career opportunities, Oregon has gone farther than
most states, but the answers supplied are still far from
satisfactory.
The most troubling question in such a compensatory
scheme is whether the lost career rationale in fact offers a com-
prehensive basis for alimony. Consider this stereotyped
hypothetical:
Dental hygienist and dentist marry at age 28. Both continue in
their jobs throughout their twenty-three year marriage and
have no children. At the time of the divorce, he, the dentist, is
making $110,000 and she is making $22,000 as a hygienist.142
Without spousal support, she will be unable to maintain the
standard of living to which she has been accustomed, and she
may have few prospects to increase her earnings sufficiently to
compensate for the loss of a share in his income. Yet, she has
made no apparent career sacrifice 143 or other uncompensated
contributions to the marriage.144
If the Oregon courts decide that she is not entitled to sup-
port, she will suffer a significant hardship. On the other hand, if
the courts assume that, but for her expectation of spousal sup-
port, she would have pursued a different career, the courts may
impose a hardship upon him. Let us assume the worst. Suppose
she leaves him for an affair with an investment banker that has
ended by the time of the divorce. He marries a widow whose
pension benefits terminate with the remarriage. Long-term ali-
mony permitting the dental hygienist to enjoy the standard of
living experienced during the marriage would reduce the stan-
marriage. See generally L. WEITZMAN, supra note 5, at 110-13, 139-42; Krauskopf, supra
note 47, at 379; Prager, supra note 95, at 6-11. The implications of these theories have yet
to be fully worked out, and judicial acceptance of either notion is as yet unclear.
142. For these purposes, we assume that his dental practice was established at the
time of the marriage, that there is no reason to believe that his practice benefitted from the
marriage, and no reason to believe that she would have pursued a different career had she
not married. We realize that in most cases she will have made some contribution to his
practice, and that it will be impossible to predict what she would have done had she not
married. For the moment, however, we proceed with these assumptions.
143. Her most obvious loss would be the greater opportunities she enjoyed at age 28
than at age 51 to marry a man earning more than she could earn on her own. See generally
supra notes 79 & 83 (statistics on remarriage).
144. Indeed, if we change the hypothetical and make the woman the dentist and the
man the dental hygienist, we suspect that the number of those believing the alimony is due
would decrease dramatically. This may be because a man in that situation is less likely to
have given up other opportunities to marry as well, or it may be because we assume that a
female dental hygienist gave up the opportunity to pursue more lucrative careers whereas a
male hygienist did not. See supra note 78.
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dard of living available to the dentist and his new wife. If the
court assumes, without requiring proof, that the first wife's
career has suffered because of the marriage, 145 if she has not
made a significant contribution to his career and her responsibil-
ity for the marriage failure is not considered, the inequity of
such an award would be self-evident. 146
One suspects that Oregon has chosen a compromise. It has
decided that continuing to permit consideration of marital mis-
conduct exacts too high a cost because of its problematic nature
and the hostility the process itself may engender. 47 To compen-
sate for the elimination of fault grounds-and the ability to
redress the lost opportunity to be married-the Oregon courts
have expanded the no fault grounds for spousal support and
softened the evidentiary requirements.1 48  In return, we would
expect either modest support awards, with a heavy emphasis on
transitional or rehabilitative payments, or surreptitious consider-
ation of marital misconduct. 19 At this point, we lack the empir-
ical data to prove our suspicions, but there is some evidence
145. The Oregon analysis suggests that such an assumption would be fairly automatic
because of the impossibility of determining what career path a woman would have chosen
had she not relied on marriage for her principal source of support. See supra note 135. If,
on the other hand, the emphasis is on "need" alone, her career sacrifice should be
irrelevant.
146. The inequities arise, in part, because he too, has suffered some losses from the
marriage. If he remarries, he has recaptured the opportunity to marry. But if he is
required to pay support, he will presumably be financially worse off than if he had never
married or had married only his second wife. See generally supra text accompanying notes
82-84, 87.
147. One goal of the divorce reform in Iowa was to limit the bitter presentation of
those details of married life that culminate in marital failure. If this is a worthy
goal, then the restraint involved in withholding from the court facts that
arguendo go to the question of fairness is not an intolerable sacrifice.
Note, Dissolution of Marriage in Iowa: Collateral Determinations Under the No-Fault Con-
cept, 22 DRAKE L. REv. 584, 597 (1973). See also L. WErrzMAN, supra note 5, at 12-14,
23-24.
148. Indeed, the effect of any declaration that the primary consideration will be
"need" is to do precisely that. See supra notes 132, 136.
149. One would expect lower alimony awards for two reasons: first, where evidence of
marital misconduct is barred, lower awards discount for the possibility that the paying
party has been injured by the other spouse's decision to end the marriage. Second, where
the career opportunities lost are assumed to have been sufficient to sustain the standard of
living enjoyed during the marriage, lower awards discount for the possibility that the
assumption is untrue. In addition, where both spouses are presumed "innocent," one
would expect the courts to be more reluctant to impose a hardship on the paying spouse.
See infra text accompanying note 182.
Transitional alimony is discussed in Atkin, supra note 28, at 342; Weitzman & Dixon,
supra note 59, at 148-49; Comment, The Fault Preclusion to Post-Divorce Alimony in
Louisiana, 57 TUL. L. REV. 351 (1982).
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from Iowa and California to indicate both are taking place. 150
In the meantime, what sets apart West Virginia and Oregon
from other states is their articulation of a basis for alimony. As a
whole, alimony decisions are characterized by ad hoc decision
making, with few clearly articulated principles and only occa-
sional disclosure of the reasoning.15 1 The continued use of this
150. Weitzman reports that the greatest change in the pattern of support awards
following the introduction of no-fault divorce law has been the change in the duration of
the awards. Between 1968 and 1972 open-ended support awards dropped from 62 to 32
percent of the support awards in Los Angeles County. L. WErrzMAN, supra note 5, at 167.
Some states have eliminated permanent alimony altogether. See supra note 105.
Sackett and Munyon concluded that, in Iowa,
[e]xcluding fault evidence at the trial court level is difficult. Dissolutions in Iowa
are tried in equity and subject to de novo review. Objections are not ruled upon,
and the evidence goes into the record even if it is clearly inadmissible. The
problem is whether the courts can and do truly disregard the fault evidence in
their consideration of awarding alimony.
Sachett & Munyon, supra note 61, at 304. In addition, while consideration of fault is pre-
cluded in the alimony determination, it is relevant to child custody proceedings and other
issues that may be before the court awarding alimony. Id. at 304-05. See, e.g., In re Mar-
riage of Janssen, 348 N.W.2d 251, 253-55 (Iowa 1984); In re Marriage of Orgren, 375
N.W.2d 710, 712-13 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985); In re Marriage of Estlund, 344 N.W.2d 276,
280 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983).
151. The most common statutory prescription for spousal support is to list a set of
appropriate considerations-length of the marriage, relative financial position of the
parties, etc.- without any guidance as to the relative importance of the factors or their
purpose in being considered. See, eg., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-319(b) (1976 & Supp.
1987); COLO. REv. STAT. § 14-10-114(2) (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-82 (1987); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit 13, § 1512(c) (1981 & Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08(2) (West
1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-(5)(a) (1982); HAW. REv. STAT. § 580-47 (1987); IDAHO
CODE § 32-705(2) (1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 504(b) (Smith-Hurd 1980); IOWA
CODE § 598.21(1) (1985); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.200(2) (Baldwin 1983); MD. FAM.
LAW CODE ANN. § 11-106(b) (1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 34 (West Supp.
1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518-552(2) (West Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452-335(2)
(Vernon 1986); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-203(2) (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23
(West Supp. 1987); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(6) (McKinney 1986); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-16.2 (1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18(b) (Baldwin 1983); OR. REV.
STAT. § 107.105(1)(d) (Supp. 1987); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 501(b) (1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 15-5-16 (1981 & Supp. 1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 752(b) (Supp. 1987); VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-107.1 (1983 & Supp. 1987); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.09.090(1) (1986); W.
VA. CODE § 48-2-16(b) (1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.26 (1981). In determining spousal
support, the courts then recite the appropriate list of considerations and announce a result,
again without reference to any rational ordering of the factors or explaining their
importance. See, eg., Vaiksnoras v. Vaiksnoras, 341 S.E.2d 637, 637 (S.C. 1986). Almost
totally absent from these decisions is an explanation of the role spousal support is intended
to play.
To illustrate the problem, let us take the almost universal emphasis on the duration of
the marriage. There are three possible justifications for considering this factor. First, the
longer the marriage, the more likely the parties are to have foregone opportunities to enter
into other favorable marriages. Second, in cases where career sacrifices are involved, the
longer the marriage, the less likely the sacrificing spouse will be able to resume the
interrupted career. Third, the longer the marriage and the greater the disparity in income,
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seemingly arbitrary pattern of decision making is inevitable,
absent judicial understanding of the purposes of alimony and the
rationale underlying the inquiry.
IV. PROTECTING THE RELIANCE INTEREST: A ROADMAP
FOR THE FUTURE
In developing this Article, we have tried to identify the cen-
tral interests in marriage that the law ought to protect upon dis-
solution of the union. We have used the concept of the "reliance
interest" to describe each spouse's change of position in reliance
on the expectation that the marriage would continue long
enough to realize a return on the individual adjustments under-
taken. In the process, the most striking conclusion of our work
may be the continuing changes in the nature of reliance and the
policy choices those changes present. While our analysis of the
reliance interest cannot in itself resolve those policy issues, we
believe that it will provide a framework for the debate. 152
Accordingly, in assessing the future role of alimony, our exami-
nation of the reliance interest allows us to begin with the follow-
ing conclusions:
1. Some concept of fault, breach of marital obligations, or
responsibility for the divorce is necessary to protect the lost oppor-
tunity to marry. So long as men generally have the opportunity
to earn substantially more than women, and many women marry
men earning substantially more than they could earn on their
own, wives' access to their husbands' income will continue to
affect their financial position in a manner which is independent
the more likely an increase in earning capacity occurred during the marriage, due (at least
to some degree) to the contributions of the supporting spouse. For further discussion of
these rationales, see infra notes 191-93 and accompanying text. Returning to the problem
posed by the dentist and the dental hygienist, if the issue is lost opportunities to marry well,
then the length of the marriage is clearly relevant. However, if the issue is lost career
opportunities, then the length of the marriage should not matter since no career
opportunities have been lost. Similarly, if the focus is on her interest in his dental practice,
then since the major investments were made before marriage, she has contributed little to
his career; thus, the duration of the marriage is unimportant. The failure to distinguish
between these possible rationales-indeed, the failure to articulate any rationale-makes
spousal support statutes and case law singularly obscure.
152. Our examination of the reliance interest does not necessarily address the
jurisprudential basis for any award of alimony. See supra note 141. As we mentioned
above, the abolition of fault grounds for divorce makes it inappropriate to base alimony on
the reaffirmation of marital obligations. In those states that permit consideration of marital
misconduct, "alimony" may be appropriate as a remedy for breach of marital obligations.
When marital misconduct is not at issue, however, the basis for spousal support remains to
be fully articulated.
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of any career sacrifice or contribution to their husbands'
career.15 3 Moreover, as women earn more, many men will also
choose mates earning more than they could earn on their own.
Protection of the interest in the other spouse's income requires
recognition of a right to have the marriage endure. 154  Thus,
where the husband earns more than his wife and chooses to
leave-or to abdicate his marital responsibilities to a degree
which justifies his wife's decision to leave-alimony is justified
by his obligation to compensate his wife for her right to have the
marriage continue.155 When the wife elects to leave or is other-
wise responsible for the divorce, she forfeits her right to continue
enjoying the benefits of her husband's greater income. Thus,
some determination of responsibility for the divorce is necessary
to a system of alimony designed to protect disparity in income
alone. 156
2. A fault based system cannot adequately protect lost career
opportunities or other contributions to their marriage. Now that
both men and women enjoy access to the labor market, and both
are ordinarily expected to be self supporting, a spouse foregoing
career advancement to benefit the family will have made a
major, uncompensated contribution to the marriage irrespective
153. See supra notes 65-67. The importance of this interest is magnified because
opportunities for remarriage are greater for men than for women. See supra notes 79 & 83.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 84-89 and notes 100 & 127.
155. The same is true for men married to women who earn more than they could earn
on their own. These men are, however, less likely to have foregone opportunities to have
married as well. See supra note 76. If the purpose of recognizing a right to have the
marriage continue is simply a surrogate for protecting reliance, one would expect less
compensation in these cases. See, eg., Pfohl v. Pfohl, 345 So. 2d 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
197.7). If, however, the purpose is to encourage reliance on marriage or to make a societal
statement about the lifetime nature of marital commitments, one would expect men to
receive the same protection as women. See infra notes 171-72.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 86-89, noting that this is true in part because
both parties sacrificed other opportunities to marry and the protection of one spouse's
interest is at the expense of the other's.
We should also note, however, that this does not necessarily mean that support awards
will be higher in states that permit consideration of fault. We would expect that awards
would be higher for some, especially women in long term marriages where the husband is
responsible for the divorce, and lower for others, especially those found responsible for the
end of a longer term marriage.
Further, we would expect that where the basis for spousal support is clearly defined
and consistent with community expectations, judges should be more willing to order
support awards that impose a hardship on the paying spouse. Nonetheless, we would still
expect the overall level of support ordered to be less than in more traditional societies so
long as virtually all recipient spouses are expected to mitigate the losses from the divorce by
working, and so long as relatively high divorce rates make it inappropriate to value
marriage in terms of a lifelong commitment. See supra notes 92-94.
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of the reasons for the divorce. A wife who puts her husband
through medical school or a husband who gives up his promis-
ing career as an advertising executive to care for the children
will have a claim for compensation even if she or he decides to
end the marriage. To protect these contributions, even a fault
based system must contain some provision for a set off against
fault based claims or for relief where responsibility for the
divorce is shared or impossible to prove.
157
3. The determination of responsibility for marital discord
imposes substantial costs upon the system. So long as fault was a
prerequisite for divorce, the financial allocations made could be
linked to the marital misconduct which justified the divorce. A
significant reason for the adoption of no fault divorce was the
difficulty of determining fault, and the hostility the process gen-
erated in what otherwise could have been amicable separa-
tions.' There is considerable fear that permitting consideration
of marital misconduct in the award of alimony would reintro-
duce the recriminations which bedeviled the fault model of
divorce.
159
While consideration of marital misconduct is inherently
troublesome for the courts, permitting consideration of marital
misconduct in the award of alimony is very different from
requiring proof of fault as a prerequisite for divorce. Fault based
divorce rested on a societal consensus that couples were morally
obligated to remain married unless the conduct of one spouse
was so incompatible with the continuation of the marriage that it
released the other spouse from his or her marital obligations.
1 60
When that societal consensus gave way to the view that the par-
ties could end their union, the fault requirement failed to serve
any purpose, and courts trivialized the requirement in an effort
157. See supra notes 99-105. The issue has been most directly raised in the context of
professional degrees. See DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981);
Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 749, 751-52 (Okla. 1979); Erickson, supra note 103, at 957,
974; Krauskopf, supra note 47, at 394. See generally Comment, supra note 63. But see
Church v. Church, 96 N.M. 388, 396, 630 P.2d 1243, 1250 (1981). See also infra notes 176
& 186.
158. See, e.g., Report of the California Governor's Commission on the Family 28
(1966); Clark, supra note 113, at 407; Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury,
52 VA. L. REv. 32 (1966); Note, Untying the Knot: The Course and Patterns of Divorce
Reform, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 649, 653-54 (1972).
159. See supra note 147.
160. See, e.g., Massey v. Massey, 621 S.W.2d 728, 730 (Tenn. 1981); McLaughlin v.
McLaughlin, 346 S.E.2d 535, 537 (Va. Ct. App. 1986); see also supra notes 23-24.
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to circumvent it.161 So long as proof of fault is not required for
the award of alimony, neither party need introduce such evi-
dence, the courts need not find one party's conduct superior to
the other, and thus the abuses which stemmed from trivializa-
tion of the requirement need not occur.
161
Moreover, to the extent marital misconduct continues to
play an important role in the determination of alimony, it does
so because the party choosing to end the marriage is required to
pay for the consequences of that decision. 163 That means that
fault should come into play only after the termination of a rela-
tively long term marriage,'14 and the determination of fault
should focus on conduct sufficiently egregious to be clearly
responsible for the divorce.' 65  A spouse's peccadillos would
become relevant only if they were incompatible with the contin-
uation of the marriage.166  Accordingly, the required judicial
161. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 138 Colo. 74, 329 P.2d 633 (1958); Friedman, supra note
5, at 659-64; Note, A Survey of Mental Cruelty as a Ground for Divorce, 15 DE PAUL L.
REv. 159 (1965).
162. This does not, however, eliminate the possibility of other types of abuse. See
sources cited infra at note 167.
163. See supra notes 71-73 and infra notes 171-73.
164. After short term marriage, it will be less likely that the marriage itself
significantly foreclosed other opportunities for marriage and more likely that the divorce
reflects the incompatibility or immaturity of the couple.
165. See, e.g., Cole v. Cole, 384 N.W.2d 312, 316 (S.D. 1986); McLaughlin v.
McLaughlin, 346 S.E.2d 535, 537-38 (Va. Ct. App. 1986); Nutter v. Nutter, 327 S.E.2d
160, 162-63 (W. Va. 1985); Massey v. Massey, 621 S.W.2d 728, 730 (Tenn. 1981); Wallace
v. Wallace, 46 Md. App. 213, 416 A.2d 1317 (1980); Dyer v. Tsapis, 249 S.E.2d 509 (W.
Va. 1978).
166. In this sense, the inquiry should be more like the determination of "breach" in
contract cases than "fault" in the tort sense. The law imposes no absolute obligation to
perform contractual obligations. There is no moral approbation associated with the
decision to terminate contracts; thus the law disfavors punitive damages and specific
performance. See 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 234-38 (M. Howe ed. 1963); R.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §§ 55-58 (1973); Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for
Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1147-48 (1970); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS, §§ 355, 357 (1981). For a somewhat different view, see generally C.
FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981). Rather, emphasis is on the need for the breaching
party to compensate the other for the consequences of the breach. See generally Fuller &
Perdue, supra note 1.
In practice, this means the primary determination is the identification of the party
choosing to end the marriage. The focus of inquiry would then shift to whether the other
spouse's conduct was sufficient to justify that decision, thereby triggering compensation.
For a list of cases dealing with this topic see supra note 165. So long as a societal consensus
continues to recognize a right to have the marriage endure, misconduct should be defined
in terms of activity incompatible with the continuation of the marriage. The traditional
categories of desertion, adultery, and extreme cruelty would therefore retain their vitality,
although the older cases should give way to interpretations more compatible with the
modem role of women. Furthermore, the categories should reflect the understanding of the
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determinations, while not necessarily pleasant, need not be oner-
ous. Nonetheless, anything less than a complete bar to the con-
sideration of marital misconduct would permit embittered
couples to use divorce proceedings to seek revenge on their for-
mer mates. 167 The question as to whether it is worthwhile to risk
such abuse depends on the strength of the other interests at
stake.
4. In defining the reliance interest in marriage, the primacy of
the lost opportunity to marry is giving way to the interest in lost
career opportunities, but the process is not, and may never be,
complete. So long as women had few opportunities to enter the
labor market, they were primarily dependent on marriage for
their support. The more equal the access to employment oppor-
tunities women enjoy, the more important become their claims
to compensation for career sacrifices made to benefit the fam-
ily. 168 Nonetheless, where there was once a single model of mar-
riage, there are now many. Many men and women enjoy greater
opportunities to marry well than to pursue successful careers.
169
Many wealthy men and women and many of those pursuing
demanding careers would prefer to marry spouses whose income
potential is less than their own, but who bring other assets to the
marriage.1 70 Finally, with opportunities to remarry continuing
to be better for men than for women, the loss of opportunities to
"marry well" will be more important than lost career opportuni-
ties for some part of the population.
5. Whether lost opportunities to marry remain sufficiently
important to outweigh the administrative costs of determining
responsibility for the divorce is a policy question which turns on
society's view on the nature of marriage. We can say with cer-
tainty that full protection of lost opportunities to marry requires
couple. Nonetheless, courts should still be encouraged to find, in appropriate cases, that
responsibility for the end of the marriage was shared or impossible to prove. See supra text
accompanying note 162. Spousal support would then be available if justified on no fault
grounds. See infra notes 176, 180 and accompanying text.
167. See Peterson v. Peterson, 242 N.W.2d 103, 108 (Minn. 1976); Clark, supra note
113, at 405; O'Kelly, supra note 57, at 257; Wadlington, Sexual Relations After Separation
or Divorce: The New Morality and the Old and New Divorce Laws, 63 VA. L. REV. 249
(1977); Comment, supra note 113, at 375.
168. See, e.g., L. WEITZMAN, supra note 5, at 12-14. The lost support from their
husbands also became less important to the extent they could mitigate that loss by working
after the divorce.
169. G. BECKER,.supra note 5, at ch. 4; Becker, A Theory of Marriage, in ECONOMIcS
OF THE FAMILY 306-07 (T. Schultz, ed. 1974).
170. Becker, Landes & Michael, supra note 5, at 1146; see also Gronau, supra note 5,
at 635.
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consideration of "fault"-by this or any other name. Whether
consideration of fault should be permitted, however, turns on the
existence of a societal consensus that marriage continues to
involve a lifelong commitment, 171 that financial reliance on that
commitment is appropriate and should be protected, 17 2 and that
these concerns are sufficiently important to outweigh the trans-
action costs involved.
173
Once the policy questions are resolved, however, the out-
lines of a rational alimony system are reasonably clear. In those
states which, like West Virginia, decide to permit (but not
require) consideration of marital misconduct in the financial
allocations made upon divorce, two different systems of compen-
171. Legally, marital vows continue to impose a lifetime commitment. See, eg., In re
Marriage of Higgason, 10 Cal. 3d 476, 110 Cal. Rptr. 897, 516 P.2d 289 (1973); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3105.06 (Baldwin 1983). See generally Krauskopf & Thomas, supra note 6,
at 568; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 190 (1981). Whether there continues
to be a societal consensus that the decision to terminate the marital union gives rise to an
obligation to compensate the disappointed expectation of the other spouse that the
marriage would continue remains an open question, and one which may be resolved
differently in West Virginia than in Oregon. Full resolution of this issue involves
consideration of the effect of divorce on children and on the evolution of gender
differentiated roles and it is thus beyond the scope of this article.
172. It is increasingly apparent that a societal consensus is forming to support
compensation for sacrifices made to benefit the family or the other spouse. See supra text
accompanying notes 94-105, 128-31, 134-36. The unresolved question is whether the higher
standard of living made possible by the marriage should be protected even where no such
sacrifices were made.
173. See supra notes 114, 157-67 and accompanying text.
Related to these issues is the additional question of whether spousal support should be
designed to discourage divorce. Becker, Landes & Michael, supra note 5, at 1156-57, argue
that the greater the financial penalty for the behavior that ends the marriage, the less
frequent divorce will become. Accordingly, they advocate tying spousal support to
determinations of fault. See generally Landes, supra note 5. There is an argument,
however, that men are relatively more responsible for divorce than women, and that the
variety of restraints described above have traditionally served to encourage men to stay
married. Under this theory, if a consequence of no fault divorce has been to lower the
frequency and amount of spousal support, divorce rates would increase as the weaker
disincentives for men would not be offset by the higher disincentives for women. See, eg.,
Olsen, supra note 7, at 1537. On the other hand, if no fault alimony were to increase the
presumption in favor of spousal support, divorce would be discouraged as the weaker
financial disincentives for women would be more than offset by the higher financial
disincentives for men. Under this theory, then, a renewed emphasis on fault would be
unnecessary to discourage divorce. Increasing the presumption in favor of spousal support
or expanding the definition of marital property would be more effective.
The major problem with this argument is that, even if the analysis is correct, there will
still be cases where the wife is responsible for the divorce. Convincing male dominated
legislatures and courts to expand spousal support at the expense of occasionally innocent
husbands may be difficult, and may well account for the relatively low level of spousal
support. See generally L. WErrZMAN, supra note 5; see also supra note 68.
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sation will co-exist. 174 One will be concerned primarily with
protecting the expectation interest in the marriage, and it will
turn on a determination of responsibility for the divorce. Where
there is a disparity in income, and the more financially secure
spouse is responsible for the termination of a long-term mar-
riage, alimony will be appropriate unless the other spouse remar-
ries or increases his or her earnings to a level commensurate
with the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage.
175  If
the less financially secure spouse is responsible for the divorce,
or if the parties share responsibility, alimony will not be appro-
priate unless it is justified on another basis.
The fault based compensation would then be offset by the
sacrifices, if any, made during the marriage. The burden of
proving such sacrifices, however, should not be onerous. If the
divorce occurs shortly after she graduates from medical school
or if a working spouse begins a pattern of sporadic labor force
participation with the birth of the couple's first child, one could
reasonably assume that he had contributed to her medical degree
or that she forewent better career opportunities to care for the
children. 176 Emphasis should then be placed on lump sum, short
term or rehabilitative payments tailored to the sacrifices made. 177
174. See supra note 129.
175. See infra note 181; see also Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, 395 Mass. 704, 481
N.E.2d 1153 (1985); In re Marriage of Carney, 122 Ill. App. 3d 705, 462 N.E.2d 596
(1984); D.E.W. v. M.W., 552 S.W.2d 280 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
176. For examples of cases recognizing career sacrifices as a basis for financial
adjustments at divorce, see In re Marriage of Elgin, 58 Or. App. 94, 647 P.2d 941 (1982);
In re Marriage of Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 318 N.W.2d 918 (1982); DeLa Rosa v. DeLa
Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981); DeWitt v. DeWitt 98 Wis. 2d 44, 296 N.W.2d 61
(1980); Morgan v. Morgan, 81 Misc. 2d 616, 366 N.Y.S.2d 97, aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
52 App. Div. 2d 804, 383 N.Y.S.2d 343, appeal dismissed, 40 N.Y.2d 843, 387 N.E.2d 839,
356 N.E.2d 292 (1976).
In addition, even short term marriages may involve some unrecoverable loss such as
pension benefits. See Wilson v. Wilson, 101 A.D.2d 536, 542, 476 N.Y.S.2d 120, 124
(1984) (The spouse "is entitled at the least, to be restored to the extent possible, to the
economic situation which pre-existed the marriage."). Cf Duttenhofer v. Duttenhofer, 474
So. 2d 251, 254 (Fla. 1985) (distinguishing between the sacrifice of employment
possibilities, a sacrifice which contributes to the marriage, and the loss of widow's benefits,
which does not).
177. See, eg., In re Marriage of Elgin, 58 Or. App. 94, 647 P.2d 941 (1982); In re
Marriage of Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 318 N.W.2d 918 (1982). For a discussion of lump
sum alimony, see In re Marriage of Feeman, 106 Ill. 2d 290, 478 N.E.2d 326 (1985);
Cornelius v. Cornelius, 382 So. 2d 710, 712-15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979). A major
difference between lump sum alimony and periodic alimony is that lump sum alimony does
not terminate upon remarriage. This is appropriate if, as we have suggested, lump sump
alimony is designed to compensate for sacrifices or other contributions made to benefit the
marriage. See discussion of rehabilitative alimony, supra note 105. Where rehabilitation is
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So long as it remains short term, the awards would not terminate
with remarriage.
1 78
These determinations will never be made with mathemati-
cal precision. Moreover, they will be limited by the needs of the
one spouse and the ability of the other to pay.179 In practice,
therefore, the fault based inquiry and the compensation based
not possible, and where permanent alimony would be inappropriate because the sacrificing
party's decision to end the marriage imposed a hardship on the other spouse, some
transitional alimony may still be appropriate. See Murray v. Murray, 374 So. 2d 622 (Fla.
1979). See generally Erickson, supra note 103, at 949, 974.
178. In general, awards intended for rehabilitative purposes should continue until the
rehabilitation is completed or abandoned, regardless of remarriage. See, e.g., In re
Marriage of Stephens-Tiley, 50 Or. App. 503, 506, 623 P.2d 1105, 1106-07 (1981) (While
wife's remarriage alone might not justify termination of spousal support, her remarriage,
"coupled with her decision not to pursue a career at this time, is a sufficient change in
circumstances to justify modification of the original decree."); see also In re Marriage of
Elgin, 58 Or. App. 93, 647 P.2d 941 (1982).
After longer term marriage, however, especially if the spouse is older or in ill health,
rehabilitation may be impossible. Compensation for career sacrifices made might then
appropriately take the form of long term alimony. See, eg., O'Neal v. O'Neal, 410 So. 2d
1369, 1371-72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); In re Marriage of Yantis, 52 Or. App. 825, 629
P.2d 883 (1981); see also supra note 110. These payments should be subject to the principle
that, in the event of remarriage, alimony should not allow the remarrying spouse to enjoy a
standard of living greater than that possible if the marriage had continued. See supra note
103; see also formulation in In re Marriage of Orgren, 375 N.W.2d 710, 713 (Iowa Ct. App.
1985) (Alimony does not terminate upon remarriage "unless lack of need is established.").
In addition, where the sacrificing party is responsible for the termination of the marriage,
the amount and duration of the payments should be relatively more circumscribed by the
other spouse's ability to pay.
179. No matter how egregious the marital misconduct, the courts are unlikely to
leave the party at fault destitute when the other party is able to pay. Conversely, if the
sacrificing spouse is able to mitigate those sacrifices through a high paying job or favorable
marriage, spousal support is unlikely. Most of the states listing factors for awarding
alimony consider the defendant's ability to pay. See, eg., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-
319(B)(b) (Supp. 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1410-10-114(2)(f) (1987); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 13, § 1512(c)(6) (1981 & Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08(2)(d) (West 1985); GA.
CODE ANN. § 19-6-5(a)(4) (1982); HAw. REV. STAT. § 580-47(11) (1987); IDAHO CODE
§ 32-705(2)(e) (1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 504(b)(6) (Smith-Hurd 1980); IOWA
CODE § 598.21(1)(f) (1985); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.200(2)(f) (Baldwin 1983); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 721 (1981 & Supp. 1987); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-
106(b)(1 1) (1984); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 34 (West Supp. 1987); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 25.103 (Callaghon Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.522(2)(g) (West Supp.
1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.335(2)(6) (Vernon 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-
203(2)(f) (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1987); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 236(B)(6) (McKinney 1986); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.18(b)j) (Baldwin 1983);
OR. REv. STAT. § 107.105(1)(d)(D) (Supp. 1987); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 501 (1955 &
Supp. 1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16 (1981 & Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
107.1(1) (1983 & Supp. 1987); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.09.090(1)(f) (1986); W. VA.
CODE § 48-2-16(b)(14) (1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.26(5) (1981); see also Colabella v.
Colabella, 86 App. Div. 2d 643, 477 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1982); Williamson v. Williamson, 84
App. Div. 2d 606,444 N.Y.S.2d 487 (1981); Pettit v. Pettit, 85 Ill. App. 3d 280,406 N.E.2d
899 (1980); In re Marriage of Mason, 93 Cal. App. 3d 215, 155 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1979).
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inquiry are likely to be combined. Where, for example, he
makes more money than she, and neither party is at fault or both
share responsibility for the break up of the marriage, the award
should be designed to encourage her self sufficiency without
unduly undermining his style of living. 180 Where he is at fault,
the award should maintain the standard of living she enjoyed
during the marriage even if it imposes some hardship upon
him."' When she is at fault, alimony should compensate her for
lost career opportunities with the amount limited by his ability
to pay. 182 There is some evidence that the states are already mov-
ing in this direction.1 83 The courts, however, need to make the
basis for their decisions far more explicit and to keep distinct the
different purposes of alimony. 184
In states which bar consideration of marital misconduct,
the courts are still struggling to refine the theory on which ali-
mony is based. So long as these states follow Oregon's lead and
tie alimony to lost career opportunities, one would expect the
trade-offs described at the end of the last section (that is, rela-
tively weak evidentiary requirements together with relatively
180. See, e.g., Nutter v. Nutter, 327 S.E.2d 160 (W. Va. 1985). This means, in part,
that awards are likely to be shorter in duration. Indeed, even "permanent" alimony is
likely to be terminated eventually, even if the spouse receiving support will never live at the
standard enjoyed during the marriage. See eg., Ward v. Ward, 41 Or. App. 447, 599 P.2d
1150, 1153-54 (1979).
181. See, eg., In re Marriage of Janssen, 348 N.W.2d 251, 253, 254 (Iowa 1984);
Massey v. Massey, 621 S.W.2d 728, 730 (Tenn. 1981) (where the court raised the amount of
alimony from $250 to $750 per month after reversing a lower court ruling that the wife was
at fault); Williamson v. Williamson, 367 So. 2d 1016, 1019 (Fla. 1979); Forster v. Forster,
436 So. 2d 966, 967 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Hurtado v. Hurtado, 407 So. 2d 627, 629
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
182. See, e.g., Flood v. Flood, 24 Md. App. 395, 400, 330 A.2d 715, 718 (1974) ("The
greater the degree of fault on the part of the wife demonstrated, the greater the need which
she must show to entitle her to an award of alimony appropriate to the circumstances
otherwise existing."); Flanagan v. Flanagan, 270 Md. 335, 311 A.2d 407 (1973).
183. See supra notes 181-82; see also MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 34 (West
Supp. 1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-365 (1984); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(6)
(McKinney 1986).
184. There is, for example, the danger in states that continue to permit consideration
of marital misconduct that the determination of "fault" will inappropriately overwhelm the
other bases of alimony, see, e.g., In re Marriage of Orgren, 375 N.W.2d 710, 713 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1985), or that the emphasis on compensation for lost career opportunities will
persuade courts to award rehabilitative alimony where permanent alimony would be more
appropriate. See, eg., the debate between the majority and the dissent over the appropriate
role of rehabilitative alimony in Walter v. Walter, 464 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1985) (reversing
trial court presumption in favor of rehabilitative alimony); Martin v. Martin, 358 N.W.2d
793 (S.D. 1984). More common, however, are the decisions, like those in West Virginia,
which fail to articulate a rationale for alimony at all. See supra note 151.
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modest, shorter term awards) to continue.185 One would also
expect compensation for contributions to the marriage, such as
the expense involved in putting a spouse through medical
school. 186
As career sacrifices no longer become an automatic part of
marriage for many women, however, one wonders whether these
states will decrease alimony awards further or expand the ration-
ale on which they are based.18 7 The larger problem is that most
states continue to justify alimony awards in terms of need with-
out systematically examining the basis for their decisions. 188 As
we have pointed out above, need (defined by an inability to
maintain the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage) jus-
tifies alimony only if we accept the principle that marriage
imposes a continuing obligation to support the financially
weaker spouse regardless of the length of the marriage, the par-
ties' respective contributions to the family, and the reasons for
the divorce.1 89 Whatever the appellate opinions say, there is no
185. Given the identical career sacrifice, in other words, one would expect a smaller
or shorter term award in Oregon than in a state where the paying party was found at fault,
and a larger payment than if the party requesting alimony had been at fault. This would be
one way of discounting the possibility that the paying party had been injured by the other
party's decision to end the marriage. See Sharp, supra note 68, at 196 n.3; supra notes 148-
49.
In theory, however, economists argue that lost career opportunities can be calculated
with some degree of precision. See Beninger & Smith, Lost Career Opportunities, 16 FAM.
L.W. 201 (1982).
186. See supra notes 97-98; see also In re Marriage of Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 318
N.W.2d 918 (1982); Church v. Church, 96 N.M. 388, 630 P.2d 1243 (1981); Wisner v.
Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 115 (1981); Moss v. Moss, 639 S.W.2d 370, 373 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1982); Erickson, supra note 103, at 974; Krauskopf, supra note 47, at 394; Loeb &
McCann, Dilemma v. Paradox: Valuation of an Advanced Degree Upon Dissolution of a
Marriage, 66 MARQ. L. REv. 495, 497 (1983); Mullenix, The Valuation of an Education
Degree at Divorce, 16 Loy. L.A.L. Rnv. 227 (1983).
187. In other words, as more women work throughout their marriages, it will become
harder to argue that, but for their reliance on marriage, these women would have pursued
careers as lucrative as those of their mates. See supra dental hygienist example at text
accompanying note 142. In those cases, spousal support to compensate for lost career
opportunities will be inappropriate, and the courts will have to face the issue of lost marital
opportunities directly.
188. See supra note 151.
189. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Auld, 72 Or. App. 747, 751, 697 P.2d 220, 222
(1985). The court, after articulating need as the "most significant factor," denied spousal
support after a nine year marriage despite the fact that the wife was unlikely to earn
anywhere near as much as the husband. We believe that the better explanation for the
outcome is that the wife sacrificed opportunities to develop her own income potential not
by raising children or contributing to the marriage, but by pursuing activites of her own, If
need were as important a consideration as the judicial pronouncements suggest, support
should have been awarded.
904 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62
evidence that any state is implementing such an expansive the-
ory of alimony.190 Rather, one suspects that these states are: (1)
acting to protect the lost opportunities to marry others-in
which case responsibility for the divorce should be a factor;191
(2) compensating lost career opportunities or other contributions
to the marriage-in which case the focus should more clearly be
on the extent of the sacrifice made;192 or (3) enacting a poorly
articulated partnership theory in which each spouse acquires a
share in the other's income-in which case the basis for the part-
nership share should be made explicit.
193
Whatever the truth behind modem alimony decisions, they
have long been characterized more by their obscurity and confu-
sion than by any clear articulation of the basis for the awards.
The changing nature of the reliance on marriage has contributed
to lack of clarity. A unitary model of marriage in which every
wife relied on her husband's income has given way to a multi-
plicity of arrangements. 194 Divorce jurisprudence premised on
fault has given way to a no fault system without consideration of
the implications for spousal support.195 A status model is giving
ground to contractual notions without conceding that the agree-
190. See L. WEITZMAN, supra note 5, at 143-46, 163-80, 182-83.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 84-89 and notes 100, 127.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 78-84, 97-105, & 176.
193. This "partnership" theory does not introduce a third form of reliance. Rather, it
provides an alternative theory which, depending on how it is defined, may protect lost
career opportunities and lost opportunities to marry. Presumably, such a theory would
imply an agreement that spouses share changes over the course of the marriage which affect
their earning potential. Upon divorce, a court's task would be to effect an appropriate
division of assets, treating income potential or "human capital" like other marital property.
While the theory is different, the effect is much like that adopted in Oregon: both parties
are entitled to continue enjoying the standard of living attained during the marriage
regardless of the reasons for the divorce. For a discussion of partnership theory, see
O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576,489 N.E.2d 712 (1985); Fineman, supra note 59, at 834;
Freed & Foster, Marital Property Reform in New York- Partnership of Co-Equals?, 8 FAM.
L.Q. 169, passim (1974); Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of
Marriage, 62 VA. L. REv. 663, 706 (1976); Krauskopf & Thomas, supra note 6, at 558;
Sharp, supra note 68,'at 198-201; Younger, supra note 17, at 69-77; UMDA § 307, 9A
U.L.A. 142-43 (1973); see also Krauskopf's discussion of human capital, supra note 47.
But see M. GLENDON, supra note 5, at 65-66, suggesting:
[I]t does not seem fair to say, as one so often reads, that persons entering
marriage, or living in a functioning marriage, normally intend and practice a
partnership-like relationship or, more accurately, a sharing of goods from each
according to ability, to each according to need. The unrealistic partnership
approach to divorce, as distinct from the realistic partnership approach to the
functioning marriage, merely serves to rationalize the imposition of a result.
194. See Fineman, supra note 59, at 841-84; supra text accompanying notes 48-65.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 112-21.
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ment of the couples alone can guide modem marriages.196
Whatever the course of future developments, redefinition of the
interests at stake in marriage and divorce is long overdue.
196. There is a major discussion underway of the contractual nature of marriage. See
generally L. WEITZMAN, supra note 11; Glendon, supra note 47, at 708; Krauskopf, supra
note 47, at 399; O'Kelly, supra note 57, at 235; Schultz, supra note 36, at 270; Comment,
The Development of Sharing Principles in Common Law Marital Property States, 28 UCLA
L. REv. 1269, 1310 (1981). The focus of much of this discussion has been on giving greater
force to the parties' individual arrangements. This emphasis on individual arrangements
results, at least in part, from the changes in the treatment of women from dependent and
inferior to equal and self supporting. Lost in the shuffle, however, is the issue of whether
the parties' agreement itself is sufficient to give legitimacy to the union, and the definition of
the societal interests which transcend the couple, such as provisions for children.
Resolution of these issues is central to any final determination of the "contractual" nature
of marriage.
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